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APPRENDI LAND BECOMES BIZARRO WORLD:
"POLICY NULLIFICATION" AND OTHER
SURREAL DOCTRINES IN THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SENTENCING
Benjamin J. Priester*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a final exam essay answer in constitutional law
premised upon the following doctrinal principles: (i) identical
findings of fact that produce identical effects on the outcome
of a decision should sometimes be constitutional and should
sometimes be unconstitutional based on formalistic doctrinal
lines unrelated to the substantive merits of the issue being
decided; (ii) decision-makers should preferably give vague
explanations grounded in moral philosophy rather than
specific explanations connected to particular findings; (iii)
appellate review of trial court decision-making is
unconstitutional; and (iv) courts are entitled to substitute
their own policy preferences for those enacted by the
legislature on questions of non-constitutional law. In fact, it
is probably unconstitutional to enact legislation expressly
compelling courts to follow the legislature's non-constitutional
policy preferences.
Naturally, we might expect such an exam answer to
receive an F. But if the exam question involved the United
States Supreme Court's new constitutional law of sentencing,
then the student has probably earned an A. Welcome to
Apprendi Land-which has now become Bizarro World.' How
* Associate Dean of Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Florida
Coastal School of Law.
1. The term Apprendi Land was coined by Justice Scalia in a characteristic
snark. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he should either get off
before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land."). The term was later
1
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did we get to this point?2
Little more than a decade ago, if you had asked any
criminal procedure professor, criminal law practitioner, or
judge to describe the doctrines of constitutional law that
specifically govern the sentencing of a convicted criminal
defendant, the answer would have been simple and reflexive:
leaving aside the myriad of special rules for capital cases,
there were not any.3 Of course, the basic, general principles
of constitutional law applied to sentencing and ensured, for
example, that the sentencing judge was neutral and unbiased
as a matter of procedural due process, or that the sentence
imposed was not motivated by an impermissible classification
of race or sex as a matter of equal protection.' But there was
no constitutional law of sentencing as such, no set of doctrines
specifically directed at either the procedure or the substance
fired back at him by Justice O'Connor. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 314 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is thus of little moment that the
majority does not expressly declare guidelines schemes unconstitutional for, as
residents of 'Apprendi-land' are fond of saying, the relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect."). Bizarro World was a concept introduced in the Superman
comics of the 1960s: it is a planet where everything is backwards to the way it is
on Earth. See generally Bizarro World, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BizarroWorld (last visited August 9, 2010). The
1990s sitcom Seinfeld famously premised an episode in its eighth season as
homage to this concept. See The Bizarro Jerry, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheBizarroJerry (last visited
August 9, 2010). Professor Bowman also has noted the aptness of the analogy.
See Frank 0. Bowman III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled
American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 81), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470516 ("But read in the context of the Blakely line,
Ice feels like an excursion into a judicial version of Bizarro World of old
Superman comics . . . .").
2. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 384 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("Applying the Sixth Amendment to current sentencing law has
gotten complicated, and someone coming cold to this case might wonder how we
reached this point.").
3. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two
Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1145 (2009) (discussing and criticizing the significant differences
between the constitutional law of capital sentencing and the constitutional law
of non-capital sentencing).
4. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that
procedural due process requires neutral decision-maker); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (recognizing the possibility of an equal protection challenge
to the motivation of a sentencing decision-maker); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (holding that the petitioner was entitled
to a neutral and detached decision-maker).
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of determining each particular defendant's sentence.'
Beginning with its landmark Apprendi decision in 2000,
the United States Supreme Court has dramatically
repudiated this traditional answer.' In just ten years, the
Court has used a series of significant decisions to develop an
extensive new constitutional law of sentencing.' Most
prominently, the decisions in Blakely and Booker declared
that mandatory sentencing guidelines which had bound state
and federal judges in the determination of sentences were
unconstitutional.' By invalidating these provisions, the
Court has used its new constitutional law of sentencing to
restore the power of sentencing judges to exercise their
discretion in imposing sentences; in doing so, the Court has
privileged the objective of an individualized punishment for
each particular offender over the objective of systemic
uniformity in maintaining consistent treatment of similar
facts in similar cases.'
In the abstract, there is nothing objectionable about the
concept of having a constitutional law of sentencing.
Especially with contemporary "sentencing reform" measures
becoming more frequent and more pervasive since the mid-
1980s,10 the imposition of some constitutional constraints on
5. The Court had rejected the only procedural due process challenges to
sentencing process it had heard. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
84-93 (1986) (upholding the imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence based on judge's finding of fact by preponderance of evidence that
defendant visibly possessed a firearm during an aggravated assault offense);
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244-51 (1949) (upholding a death sentence
based on judge's use of hearsay evidence of uncharged additional crimes and
bad moral character to find that defendant could not be rehabilitated).
6. In order of decision, the Court's early cases are: Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998);
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
7. In order of decision, the Court's subsequent, cases are: Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005);
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009); Spears v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam).
8. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304.
9. See Benjamin J. Priester, The Canine Metaphor and the Future of
Sentencing Reform: Dogs, Tails, and the Constitutional Law of Wagging, 60
S.M.U. L. REV. 209, 259-70 (2007) [hereinafter Priester, Canine Metaphor].
10. See Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense
of Conviction, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863,
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sentencing-related laws likely was inevitable. After all, even
the justices who dissented from the Court's early Apprendi
doctrine decisions conceded the need for at least some
minimal constitutional limits on legislative power.n
In reality, however, the constitutional law of sentencing
the Court actually developed is subject to several serious
objections. For one, the Court has grounded its analysis in
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, yet the
doctrines promulgated in its decisions have nothing to do
with protecting jury power.12 For another, the Court's
doctrine produces bizarre outcomes when applied, having the
effect of treating functionally identical sentencing findings
differently based on formalistic criteria unrelated to the
substantive merits of the sentence. 13 And the Court has
unjustifiably constitutionalized the primacy of individualized
punishment over systemic uniformity in sentencing particular
defendants, when in fact the balance between those
competing values at sentencing should have remained a non-
constitutional policy choice entrusted to state and federal
legislatures, not to the preferences of judges.' 4
The Court could have been forgiven for initial missteps in
its incipient doctrine if it had corrected course in later
decisions. But the Court has not done so. Instead, its most
recent decisions have only made the analytical flaws worse,
and have only compounded the problems its doctrines create.
Today, the Court's new constitutional law of sentencing is
all but unrecognizable when compared to its origin in
Apprendi. The absurd formalisms embedded in the doctrine
have been exacerbated. The doctrine now provides an
incentive for sentencing judges to reason more arbitrarily and
less transparently when determining punishment. And the
doctrine has completely lost touch with any basis in jury trial
rights, instead focusing entirely on protecting judicial power.
868-71 (2004) [hereinafter Priester, Structuring Sentencing]; see also infra note
17 (citing sources discussing origins and development of sentencing reform).
11. See infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
12. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 224-26; see also
Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 891-902 (defending a limited
version of the Apprendi doctrine in part based on protecting jury's role in
criminal procedure).
13. See Priester, supra note 9, at 221-24; see also infra Part III.A.2.
14. See Priester, supra note 9, at 266-69; see also infra Parts III.A.3,
III.B.3-C.
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In fact, the Court has become almost brazen in its emphasis
on judicial power, claiming for sentencing judges the
authority to engage in "policy nullification" by declining to
follow legislatively-adopted sentencing policies in favor of the
judges' own policy preferences. Worse, this authority is not
constrained to discarding the implicit spirit of the law so long
as the judge follows its literal letter, but seemingly extends to
a constitutionally mandated authority to ignore express
declarations of sentencing policy enacted in statutes.
The time has come for the Court to recognize these
serious problems with the new constitutional law of
sentencing, and to correct course by bringing the doctrine
back to its foundational principles. To do so the Court will
have to overturn several of its own recent precedents and roll
back the scope of constitutional law in this area. It may be
true that legislatures have enacted a wide range of unwise, if
not downright stupid, sentencing policies over the last
quarter century. But not every poor policy choice is
unconstitutional, and the solution to bad legislative judgment
should not be bad constitutional law.
II. BACKGROUND: THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SENTENCING
Since its inception, the Court's Apprendi doctrine has
generated no shortage of analysis and commentary. Literally
hundreds of law review articles, student notes, and other
publications have addressed the decisions and their holdings,
dicta, rationales, aftermath, and implications. 5  Simply
15. This extensive commentary has continued in the aftermath of the
Court's post-Booker decisions. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich,
Improving the Guidelines Through Critical Evaluation: An Important New Role
for District Courts, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 575 (2009); W. David Ball, Heinous,
Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (2009); Barkow, supra note 3; Douglas A.
Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L.
REV. 7 (2007); Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and
Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOzO L. REV. 775 (2008); Stephanos Bibas et al.,
Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2009); Bowman, supra
note 1; Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the
Rights of the Accused, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 223, 225-246; D. Michael
Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion Against a
Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65
(2007); Bradley R. Hall, Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines By Any Other Name:
When "Indeterminate Structured Sentencing" Violates Blakely v. Washington, 57
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
explaining thoroughly each of the Court's decisions, one by
one, could consume a law review article just by itself.'"
Moreover, the Apprendi doctrine is situated within a much
broader political and intellectual debate-among not only
scholars, but also practitioners, judges, legislators, and other
policy-makers--over what commonly is referred to as
"sentencing reform," a subject with an even larger existing
body of commentary." Each new contribution to the debate
over the Apprendi doctrine, then, builds upon much that has
come before.
On the other hand, the Court's new constitutional law of
sentencing is sufficiently complicated that a basic synopsis of
the doctrine is necessary to lay the groundwork for any
analytical discussion of it. The sections that follow describe
the scope of the Court's current version of the Apprendi
doctrine, as well as the seeds of potential further development
contained in the Court's decisions.
Before beginning, however, it is necessary to clarify two
important points of terminology. First, I use two labels to
refer to different types of statutes: offense-defining and
sentencing-regulating." An offense-defining statute is one
DRAKE L. REV. 643 (2009); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick,
Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Susan R.
Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ's Attack on Federal Judicial
"Leniency," the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Criminal
Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519 (2009); Susan F. Mandiberg, Why Sentencing
by a Judge Satisfies the Right to Jury Trial: A Comparative Law Look at
Blakely and Booker, 40 McGEORGE L. REV. 107 (2009); Michael M. O'Hear,
Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459 (2009); Mary Kreiner
Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal
Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591 (2009); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:
Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008).
Numerous articles followed the Court's earlier decisions in Booker, Blakely, and
Apprendi. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 217 n.33, 216 n.29,
215 n. 18 (citing sources); Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 864
nn.2 & 7, 871 n.45 (citing sources).
16. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 1, at 11-84.
17. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin Frankel's Mistakes and
the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 239 (2008)
(discussing the origins of sentencing reform policies and criticizing their
trajectory in federal sentencing); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas,
Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37 (2006) (discussing the
impact ofApprendi and Blakely on sentencing reform measures nationwide); see
also, e.g., Bowman, supra note 1, at 3-11; Fisher, supra note 15, at 67-74; Klein
& Thompson, supra note 15, at 521-35; Stith, supra note 15, at 1427-43.
18. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 899, 908;
Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v.
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that, on its face, expressly undertakes to define the elements
of a criminal offense. Such a statute usually also delineates
the available punishment for a violation of that offense, either
within the statute itself ("up to twenty years") or by reference
("a class B felony"). Sometimes the statute may define
several grades of the offense within the same section, as with
the three-tiered principal federal narcotics offense, § 841.19 A
sentencing-regulating provision, by contrast, is one that
expressly does not define the elements of a separate offense,
but rather explicitly addresses only the determination of
punishment for a violation. So-called "sentencing guidelines"
are one form of a sentencing-regulating provision, but there
are others as well, including mandatory minimums and
recidivist or "three strikes" enhancements. Some of these
regulations of sentencing authority are contained in statutes
enacted by legislatures, like the Washington state sentencing
guidelines in Blakely; others, like the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines prior to Booker, are promulgated by other methods
but are nonetheless mandatory provisions of law binding
upon sentencing judges.2 0 Much of the Apprendi doctrine's
development has involved the Court imposing constitutional
constraints on the legislature's use of sentencing-regulating
provisions to restrict the authority of sentencing judges.
Second, I use two additional labels to refer to different
types of factfinding and the procedures used to make them:
verdict facts and extraverdict facts. Verdict facts are the
facts established beyond a reasonable doubt by the guilty
verdict resulting from a conviction at a trial, or a defendant's
admission in a guilty plea. Because the Court has justified its
Apprendi doctrine under the Sixth Amendment jury trial
right, its rhetoric often refers to the necessity of jury
factfinding of certain facts, even in cases where the defendant
actually pled guilty or was convicted in a bench trial.21 To
New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281, 284-85, 301-08 (2001) [hereinafter
Priester, Constitutional Formalism].
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(b) (2006).
20. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission, an agency created by Congress with delegated power to devise the
Guidelines. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission against a
separation of powers challenge).
21. For example, Apprendi pled guilty, see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 469-70 (2000), while Harris was convicted in a bench trial, see Harris v.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
avoid confusion and maintain consistency of usage, I prefer
the label "verdict facts" to encompass the factual elements of
the offense of conviction. By contrast, extraverdict facts are
those additional facts considered at sentencing that were not
established as verdict facts. These extraverdict facts might
be found by the sentencing judge in the exercise of sentencing
discretion, or pursuant to the instructions of a sentencing-
regulating provision. Typically, sentencing-regulating
provisions, like sentencing guidelines, call for factfinding by a
preponderance of the evidence.22 Thus, extraverdict facts
frequently involve a different factfinder and a different
burden of proof than verdict facts. Another significant
component of the Court's development of the Apprendi
doctrine has involved imposing constitutional constraints on
the use of extraverdict factfinding when determining a
defendant's sentence.
A. Defining Apprendi Violations
The basic principle of the Apprendi doctrine is
straightforward: the Apprendi doctrine renders
unconstitutional the use of extraverdict factfinding to justify
imposing a longer sentence than would have been permissible
under the law based solely on the verdict facts. 23 Thus, the
doctrine does not abolish all judicial factfinding at
sentencing, nor does it require that every fact used to
increase a sentence be a verdict fact. Instead, the doctrine is
concerned only with the relationship between the verdict facts
and the defendant's maximum punishment.
What is less straightforward-and more controversial-is
the Court's determination of what qualifies as the offender's
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 551 (2002).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300 (2004); Harris, 536 U.S. at 551.
23. The Apprendi doctrine currently has one exception: when the
extraverdict fact used to increase the sentence is recidivism. See, e.g., Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis
added). Although a majority of the justices on the Court no longer support
retaining the recidivism exception, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring), the Court has yet to formally reconsider it. For
further analysis of the recidivism exception, see, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor,
supra note 9, at 213 & n.8 (citing sources); Priester, Structuring Sentencing,
supra note 10, at 876-78.
8 [Vol:51
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maximum punishment "under the law" for purposes of the
Apprendi doctrine. Over the course of its decisions, the Court
has expanded the kinds of factfinding that fall within the
doctrine's proscription. This expansion has progressed
through two steps, and may be poised to take a third.
1. Maximum Sentences Set By Offense-Defining Statutes
(Apprendi)
The Apprendi doctrine arose in cases involving
punishment levels contained in the statutes defining the
offenses for which the defendants had been convicted. Using
the doctrine, the Court held that those punishment levels had
constitutional significance, such that the maximum sentence
imposed on the defendant could not exceed the punishment
level that corresponded to the verdict facts. Consequently,
higher sentences imposed based on extraverdict facts were
unconstitutional.
The facts of the cases illustrate the operation of this
doctrine's first iteration. In Apprendi, the state firearms
offense carried a base penalty range of five-to-ten years and
an extended range of ten-to-twenty years, if various
additional facts were proven.24 Apprendi pled guilty to the
offense, but did not admit any of those additional facts as part
of his plea; nevertheless, the sentencing judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that his offense was a hate
crime and sentenced him to twelve years. 25  The Court
reversed, holding that the sentence was unconstitutional
because an extraverdict fact was used to impose a sentence
greater than the ten year maximum that corresponded to the
verdict facts.26 Similarly, the federal crime in Jones had
three sentencing tiers: up to fifteen years' imprisonment for
the carjacking offense, up to twenty-five years' imprisonment
if serious bodily injury resulted, and up to life imprisonment
if a death resulted." At trial, the jury was not instructed to
make a finding of serious bodily injury; instead, that fact was
found by a preponderance of the evidence by the sentencing
judge, who sentenced Jones to twenty-five years.2 8 The Court
24. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69.
25. See id. at 469-7 1.
26. See id. at 491-92.
27. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230-32 (1999).
28. See id. at 231.
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reversed, ruling that a sentence longer than fifteen years was
not authorized by the statute unless the fact of serious bodily
injury was established as a verdict fact.29 Finally, the Court
held in Ring that the statutory aggravating factors necessary
to impose a death sentence, rather than life imprisonment,
for capital murder must be established as verdict facts."0
The application of the Apprendi doctrine to maximum
sentences in offense-defining statutes is easily defensible.
The Court has justified it under the Sixth Amendment's Jury
Trial Clause, emphasizing that one important traditional
function of the jury was to interpose the citizenry between the
defendant and the imposition of criminal sanctions.3 1  To
impose a sentence greater than the one provided in the
offense for which the jury convicted, therefore, contravenes
the jury's constitutional power to establish verdict facts. It is
the constitutional equivalent of convicting the defendant of an
aggravated offense without following the constitutionally
mandated process.32 Similarly, in Structuring Sentencing I
defended this component of the doctrine using a similar but
broader rationale: the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure. 3
29. See id. at 251-52. Because Jones involved a federal criminal statute,
the Court's holding in that case was limited to addressing the authorized
punishment as a question of statutory interpretation-but the Court's analysis
was strongly influenced by the interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance
(which instructs the court to construe statutes in a manner that saves their
constitutionality if it is possible to do so), based on the constitutional principle it
formally adopted the following year in its holding in Apprendi. See id. at 243-
44, 243 n.6, 252.
30. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593-93, 600-05 (2002).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235-37 (2005); Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-14 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 476-90 (2000); id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 500-23
(Thomas, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002) ("Apprendi
said that any fact extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum
authorized by the jury's verdict would have been considered an element of an
aggravated crime . . . by those who framed the Bill of Rights."); Monge v.
California, 524 U.S. 721, 741 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I believe that for
federal constitutional purposes those extra four years are attributable to
conviction of a new crime.").
33. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10 (defending the
application of the Apprendi doctrine to maximum sentences in offense-defining
statutes under a constitutional structure of criminal procedure rationale).
2011] APPRENDI LAND BECOMES BIZARRO WORLD 11
2. Maximum Sentences Set By Sentencing-Regulating
Provisions (Blakely)
Once the Apprendi doctrine was adopted, defendants'
constitutional challenges to their sentences naturally
progressed to the next logical step: sentencing guidelines and
similar provisions expressly relying on extraverdict facts to
determine punishment. Unlike the statutes in the earlier
cases, these provisions expressly disclaim any role in defining
substantive offenses or expanding criminal liability. Rather,
they regulate and constrain the decision-making of the judge
who imposes sentence after a conviction upon verdict facts
has been obtained. Nevertheless, the Court held that such
mandatory sentencing provisions also have constitutional
significance, and ruled unconstitutional the increased
sentences imposed by extraverdict facts.
This second iteration of the Apprendi rule invalidated
several different forms of sentencing-regulating provisions.
In Blakely, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping, an
offense carrying a maximum punishment of ten years'
imprisonment.34 Under the legislatively promulgated
statutory state sentencing guidelines in Washington, the
punishment range was forty-nine to fifty-three months based
only on the verdict facts." At sentencing, however, the judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that Blakely
committed his crime with deliberate cruelty, and accordingly
imposed a sentence of ninety months.36 The Court held the
increased sentence unconstitutional because it exceeded the
punishment authorized under the sentencing-regulating
statutes for the verdict facts.3
Similarly, the defendant in Booker was convicted of
narcotics distribution, a federal offense carrying a statutory
punishment range of ten years to life." Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission pursuant to power delegated to the
agency by Congress, the punishment range based only on the
verdict facts was 210-262 months.3 9  Based on additional,
34. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-300.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 303-05.
38. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005).
39. See id.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
extraverdict findings of drug quantity and obstruction of
justice, the sentencing judge imposed 360 months.4 0 The
Court likewise invalidated this sentence, applying Blakely.4 1
Finally, the defendant in Cunningham was convicted of a
child sex abuse offense with three specific available
sentences: six, twelve, or sixteen years' imprisonment.42
Applying California's Determinate Sentencing Law, the
sentencing judge found several aggravating circumstances
were present and imposed the upper term sentence.43 The
Court reversed, concluding that, as in Blakely and Booker,
extraverdict factfinding had been used to impose a sentence
longer than the maximum available based on the verdict
facts.44
In 2009, however, the Court recognized a significant
exception to the Blakely expansion of the Apprendi doctrine:
the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple
convictions in the same trial. In Ice, the defendant was
convicted on six counts, including one burglary charge and
two charges of child sexual assault for a pair of incidents
about eight months apart. Running all six counts
concurrently, Ice's sentence would have been ninety months. 6
Instead, the sentencing judge made extraverdict findings that
resulted in running four of the six charges consecutively, and
imposed a sentence of 340 months. 47 The five-justice majority
in Ice affirmed the sentence, arguing that the decision
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences had
always rested historically with the sentencing judge, such
that it could not be considered part of the jury's role protected
40. See id. The facts were similar in the consolidated, companion case of
United States v. Fanfan: the statutory range was five to forty years, the verdict-
facts Guidelines range was sixty-three to seventy-eight months, and the judge
imposed 188 months based on extraverdict factfinding of drug quantity and
defendant's leadership role in the crime. See id. at 228.
41. See id. at 231-35.
42. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-76 (2007).
43. See id. at 275-76, 276 n.2.
44. See id. at 288-93.
45. See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 715 (2009).
46. See id. at 716 n.5.
47. See id. at 715-16. The judge found that the two burglaries should be
sentenced consecutively from each other, and that two of the sexual assault
convictions should also be sentenced consecutively from each other and from the
burglary counts, but ran the remaining two sexual assault convictions
concurrently. See id.
12 [Vol:51
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by the Apprendi doctrine.48 The four-justice dissent rejected
that analysis, insisting that because the state sentencing
statutes mandated concurrent sentences unless additional
facts were established, the imposition of consecutive
sentences based on extraverdict facts was indistinguishable
from the sentence increases invalidated by the Apprendi
doctrine.4 9 Thus, although the Blakely expansion limits the
use of extraverdict facts to increase the sentence for a single
offense, it does not apply to determinations about how to
combine punishment when sentencing for multiple offenses.
The Blakely expansion of the doctrine diverges from the
core rationale underlying Apprendi. In these cases, there can
be no doubt that the sentence imposed fell within the
punishment scope of the offense defined by the verdict facts;
there is no argument that the sentencing judges acted ultra
vires by convicting the defendant of an aggravated offense
based on extraverdict facts rather than verdict facts. The
Court implicitly concedes as much, shifting its analysis to
whether the otherwise-permissible sentence was nevertheless
necessarily contingent upon extraverdict facts. According to
the Court, if the longer sentence would constitute reversible
error under the sentencing-regulating provisions but for the
extraverdict facts, then the verdict facts alone did not
authorize that sentence.50 Thus, under Blakely, the verdict
facts delimit not only the offense of conviction, but also the
operation of mandatory sentencing provisions that bind the
power of sentencing judges. In Structuring Sentencing and
The Canine Metaphor, I explained why the Blakely expansion
of Apprendi was unjustified."
3. Maximum Sentences Set By Appellate Review As
Applied (Coming Soon?)
In several recent cases, Justice Scalia has argued that
48. See id. at 716-18.
49. See id. at 720-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-75, 288-89, 291-
93 (2007) (explaining that, under California's Determinate Sentencing Law, a
sentencing judge lacks power to impose an upper term sentence absent a finding
of aggravated circumstances); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231-35
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-05 (2004).
51. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 896-907;
Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 221-26, 260-66 (explaining the lack
of justification for the expansion of the Apprendi doctrine through Blakely).
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the Apprendi doctrine necessitates an additional expansion:
giving constitutional significance to maximum sentences
created not by offense-defining statutes or sentencing-
regulating provisions on their faces, but rather by the as-
applied operation of appellate review of sentences imposed by
trial courts.52 He argues that to the extent the length of the
sentence could not be upheld on appellate review without the
presence of certain facts, those facts also must be established
as verdict facts under Apprendi. Because Justice Scalia has
long been the leader in shaping the scope of the Apprendi
doctrine, his analysis in these cases must be taken
seriously. 3
Justice Scalia presented his argument in cases involving
the application of post-Booker reasonableness review of
federal sentences, as discussed further below,54 but his
analysis equally applies to all appellate review of the
substantive justification for sentences, including in non-
guidelines or discretionary sentencing regimes. His basic
position is simple. In any sentencing regime in which the
trial court lacks complete discretion to impose any sentence
up to the statutory maximum based solely on the verdict
facts, then "for every given crime there is some maximum
sentence that will be upheld as reasonable based only on the
[verdict facts] . . . . Every sentence higher than that is legally
authorized only by some judge-found fact, [and is] in violation
of' the Apprendi doctrine as-applied. 5
Consider, for example a post-Booker federal robbery
conviction that has a baseline sentence of thirty-three to
forty-one months, but which, based on three additional
Guidelines facts, has an advisory sentence of 235-293
52. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 370-84 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 112-14 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 60 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
53. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 233 n.113 (discussing
Justice Scalia's leading role in Apprendi doctrine cases). The only merits
opinion in the Apprendi line of cases in which Justice Scalia was not on the
majority side is the 2009 decision in Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009). See
also infra Part II.C (describing and discussing views of the various justices in
Apprendi doctrine cases).
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. Rita, 551 U.S. at 372-73 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Marlowe v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 450 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
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months. 6 Justice Scalia argues it "is evident" that a sentence
of 293 months "would surely be reversed as unreasonably
excessive" without a finding of those three facts to justify its
length." Consequently, those three facts "are the legally
essential predicate for [the] imposition of the 293-month
sentence" and the Apprendi doctrine mandates that the
findings be made as verdict facts, not extraverdict facts." He
concludes that "there is a fundamental difference, one
underpinning our entire Apprendi jurisprudence, between
facts that must be found in order for a sentence to be lawful,
and facts that individual judges choose to make relevant to
the exercise of their discretion."" For Justice Scalia, it is
irrelevant whether the facts must be found because a statute
or guideline facially commands it, or because appellate review
as-applied commands it-and appellate review commands the
facts must be found in any situation where the sentence
would not be upheld on appeal without the additional facts to
justify its length.o
Like the Blakely expansion, Justice Scalia's proposed
additional expansion diverges far from the core rationale of
the Apprendi doctrine. His as-applied argument, if accepted
by the Court, would move constitutional restrictions far
deeper into the determination of a defendant's sentence than
the Court has already gone. Given Justice Scalia's successful
track record in shaping the development of the Apprendi
doctrine, that acceptance may very well occur sooner rather
than later." Accordingly, I address several significant
56. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 372.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 373.
60. See id. at 370-74.
61. In May 2010, the Court avoided this constitutional issue entirely in a
sentencing case by reaching its decision on grounds of statutory interpretation.
See United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2173-74, 2180 (2010). The
defendants pled guilty to several charges arising from an attempted robbery of
an armored car, including one count of violating § 924(c), due to the presence of
firearms during the offense. See id. at 2173-74. Under the statute, the
defendants faced sentences of five years to life for possessing a gun, seven years
to life if the gun was brandished, and thirty years to life if the gun was a
machinegun. See id. at 2175-76 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) &
(B)(i)-(ii) (1998)). The district court held that the nature of the firearm as a
machinegun was an element of the offense, and the Government conceded it
could not prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 2173.
Accordingly, the district court refused to apply the thirty years minimum
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critiques of Justice Scalia's as-applied position below.
4. But Not Mandatory Minimum Sentences (Harris-For
Now)
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the Court has
limited the application of the Apprendi doctrine to the facts
that determine the defendant's maximum sentence. The
Court has followed this course even though the operation of
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions has a comparable
effect: to compel the imposition of more punishment on the
defendant than would otherwise be imposed. It seems
possible, therefore, that the Court may reverse course and
extend the Apprendi doctrine to prohibit use of extraverdict
facts in determining the bottom and top ends of the
authorized punishment for each defendant.
The exclusion of mandatory minimum provisions from
the Apprendi doctrine is a consequence of the Court's divided
opinion in Harris. In that case, the defendant was convicted
sentence; the court of appeals affirmed, relying heavily on a prior Supreme
Court decision construing an earlier version of the statute. See id. at 2174
(discussing Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000)). Because the
defendants admitted to brandishing the guns during the offense, the district
court sentenced one defendant to seven years and the other to eight and a half
years on the § 924(c) count. See id. at 2174. In their briefs to the Court, the
defendants had urged the Court to apply the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, relying on Justice Scalia's argument: because a sentence of thirty
years on the § 924(c) count would not be upheld on appeal (under Booker-Rita
reasonableness review, see infra Part II.B.2.) absent the machinegun finding,
the statute must be construed as making that finding a verdict fact to avoid a
violation of Apprendi-Booker. See Brief for Respondent O'Brien at 37-55,
O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (No. 08-1569); Brief for Respondent Burgess at 29-43,
O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (No. 08-1569).
Thus, O'Brien presented an opportunity for the Court to address Justice
Scalia's position. The opinion for the Court by Justice Kennedy, however,
discussed only issues of statutory interpretation in ruling that the finding of a
machinegun must be made as a verdict fact. See O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2165-80.
The solo concurring opinions by Justice Stevens and Justice Thomas did
address the constitutional implications of § 924(c), but only by calling for the
Court to overrule its prior decisions in McMillan and Harris; neither opinion
made reference to Justice Scalia's position or its implications for the facts in
O'Brien. See id. at 2181-83 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2183-84 (Thomas,
J., concurring). Given the narrow basis of the Court's ruling-and the fact that
Justice Scalia himself did not write separately to discuss the application of his
constitutional position to the facts of the case-it seems likely that the O'Brien
decision does not provide any meaningful signals about how many other
justices, if any, might be willing to adopt Justice Scalia's position in a case
where it is squarely presented. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the diverging
views of the justices on numerous Apprendi-Blakely issues).
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at trial of one count of the § 924(c) federal firearms offense,
which authorizes a punishment of five years to life for using,
carrying, or possessing a firearm during a narcotics offense,
as well as seven years to life if the firearm is brandished, and
ten years to life if it is discharged.12  The verdict facts
established that Harris carried a firearm during the narcotics
offense, and at sentencing, the judge made an additional
finding that Harris had brandished the weapon and imposed
the seven-year mandatory minimum.6 3 The Court affirmed
the sentence, but no rationale gained a majority. A four-
justice plurality argued that the Apprendi doctrine should
apply only to the top end of the authorized punishment, and
therefore the mandatory increase in the minimum sentence
was permissible. 64  A four-justice dissent insisted that the
underlying principle of the Apprendi doctrine reached both
the top and bottom ends, making the mandatory minimum
sentence unconstitutional because it was imposed based on
an extraverdict fact, rather than a verdict fact. Justice
Breyer's decisive concurring opinion, speaking only for
himself, agreed with the dissent on the logic of its principle
but joined the majority on the result.66  Consequently, while
the doctrinal result in Harris remains good law, its weight as
precedent is weak. To date, however, the Court has not
granted certiorari in a case that squarely presents the issue
of revisiting Harris.
62. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550-51, 554 (2002)
(discussing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000)).
63. See id. at 550-52. In Harris, the verdict facts were established by
conviction at a bench trial. See id. at 551.
64. See id. at 556-68 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
65. See id. at 572-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 569-72 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer agreed that
not applying the Apprendi doctrine to minimum sentences was illogical, but
refused to join the dissenting opinion in forming a majority for that doctrinal
outcome because he believed Apprendi was wrongly decided and accordingly
should be applied narrowly. See id.
67. The opinion for the Court in O'Brien did not broach the issue of the
continued validity of Harris. See supra note 61 (discussing the facts and
opinions in O'Brien). This is not surprising, as the prospect of overruling Harris
was not briefed and argued as a question presented in O'Brien. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 19-21, United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010)
(No. 08-1569). Nevertheless, during the oral argument in O'Brien, Justice
Breyer suggested that he might be willing to reconsider his dispositive vote in
Harris and vote to overrule that decision. Id. at 19 ("But in Harris, I said that I
thought Apprendi does cover mandatory minimums, but I don't accept
Apprendi. Well, at some point I guess I have to accept Apprendi, because it's
18 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:51
The future of the Harris limitation on the Apprendi
doctrine depends on the future scope of the doctrine itself. In
Structuring Sentencing, I defended the Apprendi-Harris rule
as fully consistent with the constitutional structure of
criminal procedure." The Court, however, has extended the
Apprendi doctrine to also include the Blakely expansion. If
this position remains controlling, it is difficult to see why
Harris should not be overruled"-especially if the Court
further extends Blakely to reach Justice Scalia's as-applied
position.
the law and has been for some time."); see also O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2183 n.6
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Breyer's comments during oral
argument). Moreover, the facts of O'Brien more directly implicated Justice
Scalia's position on as-applied Blakely challenges (because the thirty years
sentence would exceed the maximum otherwise-permissible, verdict-facts-
authorized sentence on the gun charge), rather than implicating a true increase
in a minimum sentence beneath a verdict-facts-authorized maximum. To
squarely confront Harris, it seems likely the Court would need to review a case
raising the latter factual scenario.
In O'Brien, only the concurring opinions of Justice Stevens and Justice
Thomas discussed the continued validity of Harris, and both justices explicitly
called for overruling it. See O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. at 2181-83 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 2183-84 (Thomas, J., concurring). Interestingly, Justice
Ginsburg did not join either opinion, despite having joined the original dissent
in Harris. Similarly of interest, the Court had decided a case in the previous
Term involving a true mandatory-minimum increase under this very statute,
yet did not reconsider the Harris holding in its decision there. See Dean v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009). Thus, it is difficult to predict when the
Court might revisit Harris in a future case.
68. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 902-09
(defending the Apprendi-Harris rule as consistent with the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure); see also Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note
9, at 230-31. Justice Alito appears to agree that once the verdict facts
determine the maximum available punishment, the use of extraverdict facts to
increase the minimum punishment is constitutionally permissible. See Gall v.
United States, 551 U.S. 38, 64 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting)
It would be a coherent principle to hold that any fact that increases a
defendant's sentence beyond the minimum required by the jury's
verdict of guilty must be found by a jury. Such a holding, however,
would clash with accepted sentencing practice at the time of the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment.
Id.
69. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 231-34; see also id. at
233-34 (discussing "the Scalia conundrum," that is, Justice Scalia's divergence
in Harris from the other four justices in the Apprendi majority); Bowman, supra
note 1, at 27, 36-37 (discussing the persistence of Justice Scalia's Harris
position).
20111 APPRENDI LAND BECOMES BIZARRO WORLD 19
B. Avoiding Apprendi Violations and Booker-Rita
Reasonableness Review
Most of the decisions developing and applying the
Apprendi doctrine resulted in the reversal of the individual
defendant's sentence as unconstitutional. More importantly
for systemic purposes, the decisions also necessitated changes
in drafting or implementing sentencing laws to avoid
continued reversals of sentences in future cases.
1. Responding to Apprendi and Blakely
Following Apprendi's ruling regarding offense-defining
statutes, the natural response was simply to prove the
relevant facts as verdict facts. That is, just as Apprendi had
characterized them, the facts would be established as
elements of an aggravated offense. For example, in a
carjacking case like Jones, the fact of serious bodily injury
would be submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, or admitted by the defendant in a guilty plea colloquy,
to authorize the longer, twenty-five year penalty. o Similarly,
the requisite quantities of narcotics in the three-tiered
principal federal narcotics offense, § 841, also became verdict
facts when prosecutors sought punishments in the higher
tiers." Indictments now routinely allege facts triggering
statutory offense tiers or enhanced statutory punishments.7 2
A more complicated question, however, was how to
respond to Blakely's ruling expanding the Apprendi doctrine
to reach what are indisputably sentencing-regulating
provisions. One option, just as after Apprendi, was to ensure
proof of all implicated facts as verdict facts-colloquially
referred to as "Blakely-izing" state sentencing guidelines."
That is, facts that previously had been determined by the
judge at sentencing now would be required to be submitted to
the jury or admitted in a guilty plea; this sustained the
70. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 402 F.3d 294, 296 (1st Cir.
2005) ("[Tlhe indictment further charged that the carjackings had resulted in
serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2).").
71. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 524 F.3d 549, 555 n.9 (4th Cir. 2008)
("[Tlhe threshold drug quantities in § 841(b) constitute elements of aggravated
drug trafficking offenses. . . .").
72. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 542 F.3d 921, 922-23 (1st Cir. 2008);
Gonzalez-Mercado, 402 F.3d at 296.
73. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 247-49; see also United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
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constitutionality of the lengthened sentences imposed by
bringing the factfinding procedures used to establish those
facts into compliance with Blakely. 74 After Blakely, most of
the states with mandatory guidelines systems chose to adopt
this solution for their sentencing regimes." The other option
was the converse: to eliminate the mandatory nature of the
sentencing-regulating provisions so that the lengthened
sentence was no longer contingent on extraverdict facts for its
legal authorization. If any sentence, short or long, within
the offense-defined maximum punishment actually is legally
authorized by the verdict facts alone, then the judge's
discretionary consideration of extraverdict facts in selecting a
particular punishment, long or short, does not implicate the
proscription of Blakely.7  Several states with previously
mandatory guidelines systems adopted this solution."
In Booker, the Court addressed the question of how to
respond to the post-Blakely unconstitutionality of sentences
imposed pursuant to the mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The issue was one of statutory interpretation and
congressional intent: given that the operation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional under Blakely to
the extent it authorized increased maximum punishments
using extraverdict facts, would Congress have wanted (a)
the Guidelines to continue to be enforced as binding, but
using factfinding by verdict facts, or (b) that the Guidelines
instead be transformed into non-binding, advisory sentencing
provisions continuing to use extraverdict facts? 0 With a
different alignment of justices than its merits opinion, the
Booker Court adopted the latter solution in its remedial
opinion."' The remedial dissenters argued that Congress had
been concerned primarily with constraining the sentencing
power of federal judges, and therefore would have wanted the
74. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 248-49.
75. See id. at 248-49 n.180; see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S.
270, 294 & n.17 (2007); Bibas & Klein, supra note 15, at 785-88, 797-805.
76. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 248; see also Booker, 543
U.S. at 233, 246.
77. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 234; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 369-70 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. See Priester, supra note 9, at 248-49 n.179; see also Cunningham, 549
U.S. at 294 & n.18; Bibas & Klein, supra note 15, at 785-88, 797-805.
79. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230-37 (2005).
80. See id. at 243-49.
81. See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines to retain their binding effect, even if that meant
proving many Guidelines facts as verdict facts rather than
the extraverdict facts originally contemplated.8 2 By contrast,
the remedial majority concluded that Congress primarily
valued the extraverdict factfinding and real-offense
sentencing system created by the Guidelines, and therefore
would have preferred that they have non-binding, advisory
effect.83
Accordingly, the Booker remedial majority, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, severed from the operation of the
Guidelines the statutory sections which made the Guidelines
mandatory for the sentences imposed by district court
judges.8 4 It also severed the statutory section that subjected
Guidelines sentences to de novo appellate review. In their
place, the remedial majority held that the Guidelines were
82. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 272-303 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 303-05
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 323-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Priester,
Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 265-66 & nn.232-41.
83. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246-68 (Breyer, J., majority opinion); see also
Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 264-65 & nn.224-31.
84. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-60.
85. See id. at 260-65. Both before and after Booker, a district court's
interpretation and application of the Guidelines is a question of law reviewed de
novo. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (noting that "improperly calculating[] the
Guidelines range" is a reversible "procedural error" under Booker-Rita
reasonableness review). Before Booker, when the district court applied the
Guidelines provisions authorizing a departure from the otherwise-applicable
Guidelines sentence, that decision was, prior to 2003, reviewed for abuse of
discretion; after the PROTECT Act amendments in 2003, departures were
reviewed de novo. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 360-67 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (describing and discussing review of outside-Guidelines
sentences under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), the 2003
amendments, and Booker).
Additionally, to the extent the correctness of a judge's finding of fact is
itself in question on appeal, the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review
applies, both before and after Booker. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 361-62 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that "[cIritically, we did not touch the portions of § 3742(e)
requiring appellate courts to . . . 'accept the findings of fact of the district court
unless they are clearly erroneous' . . . . By leaving those portions of the statute
intact while severing the portion mandating a de novo standard of review,
Booker restored the abuse-of-discretion standard identified in [Koon]."(quoting
Booker, 543 U.S. at 271)); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (noting that "selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts" is a reversible "procedural error"
under Booker-Rita reasonableness review). For additional discussion of
standards of review on appeal before and after Booker, see Hessick & Hessick,
supra note 15, at 4-28.
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now advisory for district court judges, who were to rely on the
Guidelines only as one consideration among a list of
statutorily-prescribed factors when determining a defendant's
sentence. 6 In addition, the remedial majority held that
sentences imposed pursuant to this altered Guidelines
sentencing regime would be reviewed under a
"reasonableness" standard on appeal.
2. Advisory Guidelines and Reasonableness Review under
Booker-Rita
The Court's decision in Booker not only crafted a remedy
to avoid the Blakely violations inherent in the mandatory
Guidelines, but it also fundamentally changed the way
federal sentencing analysis is performed in both district
courts and on appeal. Prior to Booker, the Guidelines
analysis was essentially the same at both levels: the district
court calculated and imposed a sentence pursuant to the
Guidelines, and the appellate courts determined whether that
calculation involved any reversible error." After Booker, and
after the Court's clarifying explanations in Rita, district
courts and appellate courts must analyze sentencing in very
different ways.
The district court must begin by calculating the
Guidelines sentence. Although the result of this calculation
no longer has mandatory effect, performing the Guidelines
calculation remains a necessary first step in sentencing to
ensure the Guidelines retain their advisory effect under the
federal sentencing statutes as interpreted by the Booker
remedial majority.89 Thus, in every case the court must
consider the advice offered by the Guidelines, even if the
judge decides to reject that advice and impose a different
sentence.9o
Next, the district court looks beyond the Guidelines and
also considers the list of statutory factors in § 3553(a). 1
These factors are: "(1) offense and offender characteristics; (2)
86. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 259-60 (2005).
87. See id. at 260-65.
88. See supra note 85; see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 15, at 5-7
(describing appellate review of sentences imposed under pre-Booker mandatory
Guidelines).
89. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49; Rita, 551 U.S. at 338.
90. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
91. See id. at 49-50; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 342-45 (2007).
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the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing,
namely (a) 'just punishment' (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c)
incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally
available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing
Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution."92
The statute directs that, in consideration of all the factors,
the sentence imposed must be "sufficient, but not greater
than necessary" to serve the purposes of punishment in factor
(2)."1 Significantly, the Rita Court emphasized that district
judges should not accord the Guidelines' advice any special
weight, nor should they apply presumptive appropriateness to
them.9 4 Instead, the Guidelines calculation is only one
component of the § 3553(a) analysis and is no different than
the other factors. If the court, in assessing those factors
together with the Guidelines sentence, concludes that the
advice of the Guidelines is sound, then the court likely will
impose a sentence within the Guidelines range. On the
other hand, if the court concludes the § 3553(a) factors
diverge from the Guidelines, then the court may reject the
Guidelines' advice and impose a different sentence.9 6  In
either situation, the court must give its reasons for imposing
the selected sentence. When the court accepts the advice of
the Guidelines its explanation frequently will be short,
because the judge agrees that the case is a typical one and
92. Id. at 347-48 (paraphrasing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 347-48.
94. In Rita, the Court emphasized that "the presumption before us is an
appellate court presumption," not one used by district courts. See Rita, 551 U.S.
at 351; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 113-14 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring)
If there is any thumb on the scales; if the Guidelines must be followed
even where the district court's application of the § 3553(a) factors is
entirely reasonable; then the 'advisory' Guidelines would, over a large
expanse of their application, entitle the defendant to a lesser sentence
but for the presence of [extraverdict facts]. This, as we said in Booker,
would violate [the Apprendi doctrine.]
Id. The Court reiterated the point in a 2009 per curiam opinion. See Nelson v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 891 (2009) (per curiam).
95. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 355-56 ("[Wlhere the judge and Commission both
determine that the Guidelines sentence is an appropriate sentence for the case
at hand, that sentence likely reflects the § 3553(a) factors. . . .").
96. See id. at 350-51 (describing reasons why a district judge might reject a
Guidelines advisory sentence).
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therefore warrants a typical sentence.97 When the court
rejects the advice of the Guidelines, a more lengthy
explanation may be needed to enable the appellate courts to
assess whether the sentence selected was permissible.98
On appeal, the appellate court determines whether the
sentence imposed was "reasonable" in light of the § 3553(a)
factors. In Booker, the remedial majority could only infer
statutory support for the "reasonableness" standard,99 and it
did not provide any especially helpful definition of the
standard. 0 0  In Rita, the Court clarified that "appellate
'reasonableness' review merely asks whether the trial court
abused its discretion."' 0' The Court's subsequent decisions
applying Booker-Rita reasonableness review have repeated
this clarification in upholding district courts' sentences as not
abuses of discretion. 0 2  In Gall, however, the Court
reaffirmed traditional appellate-review principles by further
clarifying that a "significant procedural error"-including
"failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range"-is inherently an abuse of discretion subject to
reversal. 103 Only after concluding that the district court's
sentence is free from procedural defects, then, does the
appellate court proceed to review the substantive question of
whether the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion.104
97. See id. at 357-58.
98. See id.
99. Compare United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) ("[W~e read
the statute as implying this appellate review standard ... ), with .id.at 308-10
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's needs to supplement the text that remains
after severance suggests that it is engaged in redrafting the statute rather than
just implementing the valid portions of it." (quoting Unites States v. Treasury
Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995))).
100. Compare Booker, 543 U.S. at 262-63 ("[We think it fair ... to assume
judicial familiarity with a 'reasonableness' standard" for sentencing appeals),
with id. at 310-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the very concept of having a
unitary standard of review for all kinds of appeals . . . finds no support in
statutory language or established practice of the last two decades.").
101. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351; see also id. at 360-64 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
102. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007); Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007); Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840,
842 (2009) (per curiam).
103. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also Priester, supra note 9, at 255 n.198
(citing cases on traditional abuse of discretion standard).
104. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also id. at 56 ("Since the district court
committed no procedural error, the only question for the Court of Appeals was
whether the sentence was reasonable-i.e., whether the District Judge abused
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In doing so, the appellate court does not conduct its own
independent evaluation of the value of the Guidelines' advice
or the relative significance of the other § 3553(a) factors on
the facts of the case, but rather evaluates only whether the
sentence imposed by the district court is a reasonable
application of § 3553(a) in the aggregate.'o
Just as in the district courts, the Guidelines are only one
component of the appellate court's assessment of whether the
sentence imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion. After
Booker, some of the circuits had adopted a presumption that a
sentence imposed within the advisory Guidelines range was
reasonable.' 6  Similarly, several circuits had adopted a
principle that a sentence varying from the advisory
Guidelines range had to be justified by an explanation
proportionately persuasive to the degree of the variance. 0
The Court allowed the former presumption, but rejected the
latter principle.
In Rita, the Court found that an appellate presumption of
reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence was
permissible. Rita was convicted on five counts, including
perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice, for which
the Guidelines sentence range was thirty-three to forty-one
months. 1 s The district judge considered Rita's arguments for
leniency, but concluded that a thirty-three month sentence
best satisfied the § 3553(a) factors. 09  When Rita appealed,
arguing his sentence should have been even lower, the court
of appeals upheld the sentence, concluding that Rita had not
rebutted the presumption that a within-Guidelines sentence
was reasonable on the facts of his case.110 The Supreme
Court affirmed, explaining that the appellate court's
presumption was permissible not because the advice of the
his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported a sentence of
probation and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines range.").
But see Hessick & Hessick, supra note 15, at 14-36 (arguing that Booker-Rita
reasonableness review is substantially different than traditional abuse of
discretion review).
105. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 ("The fact that the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.").
106. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 346.
107. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45 (2007).
108. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341-45 (2007).
109. See id. at 344-46.
110. See id. at 345-46.
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Guidelines carries special weight, but because a within-
Guidelines sentence reflects the double agreement of the
district judge and the Sentencing Commission that the
sentence imposed is consistent with the § 3553(a) factors."'
So long as the presumption is genuinely rebuttable, it
preserves the advisory nature of the Guidelines consistent
with the Booker merits holding." 2
The Rita Court also underscored that the converse was
not true: an appellate court must not presume that a sentence
outside the Guidelines is unreasonable, because under Booker
the district court is entitled to disagree with the
Commission's application of the § 3553(a) factors." The
Court reaffirmed this principle in Gall by invalidating the use
of proportionality review.114 Gall pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute ecstasy, an offense he had committed about four
years earlier while a college student."' Although the
Guidelines range was thirty to thirty-seven months, the judge
sentenced Gall to only three years probation, citing
circumstances such as Gall's age and immaturity at the time
of the offense, his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy,
and his self-rehabilitation and good works after leaving the
conspiracy." 6 When the Government appealed the sentence
as too lenient, the court of appeals reversed; it described the
sentence as "a 100% downward variance" from the Guidelines
and assessed the cited circumstances as inadequately
persuasive to justify such a steep difference from the
Guidelines' advice.' 17  The Court rejected this analysis,
explaining that abuse of discretion review of the district
court's application of the § 3553(a) factors applies across the
full punishment range, and that the application of the factors
does not countenance heightened standards of review, even
111. See id. at 347 ("[T~he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time an
appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same
conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case.").
112. See id. at 350-55; see also id. at 363-67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 355.
114. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The Court originally
had granted certiorari to resolve this question in the same Term as Rita, but
"the case was mooted by [the defendant's] untimely death." See id. at 40-41
(discussing United States v. Claiborne, 551 U.S. 87 (2007)).
115. See id. at 41-43.
116. See id. at 43-45.
117. See id. at 45-46.
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for outlier sentences."' Thus, an outlier sentence may be
reversed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion, but the
degree of difference from the advisory Guidelines range does
not carry special weight in making that conclusion. 119
Finally, in Kimbrough the Court emphasized the primacy
of the § 3553(a) factors in federal sentencing under the
Booker-Rita regime. Kimbrough pled guilty to narcotics
offenses involving specific quantities of both crack and
powder cocaine. 120 Accordingly, his crimes implicated the
long-controversial "100:1 ratio" applicable in cocaine
offenses.1 21 In both the three tiers of the offense-defining
statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006), and the numerous gradations
of the implementing Guidelines sentencing provision (§
2D1.1), a given quantity of crack cocaine is comparable to an
amount of powder cocaine one hundred times larger.122
Under the Guidelines, Kimbrough's advisory sentence range
was 228-270 months; based on a 1:1 ratio, it would have been
ninety-seven to 106 months.12 3  Bound by the governing
statutory mandatory minimum sentences, the judge
sentenced Kimbrough to 180 months' imprisonment. 124 When
the Government appealed the sentence as too low, it won in
the court of appeals but lost in the Supreme Court.125 The
Kimbrough Court rejected the Government's argument that
the 100:1 ratio was a congressionally-mandated sentencing
policy that the sentencing judge had no authority to ignore,
even under Booker-Rita sentencing. 126 The Court conceded
that the ratio appeared in the offense-defining statute, but
argued that its placement there only codified minimum and
maximum sentences for the three offense tiers, and was not
an implicit command for the scaling of all cocaine sentences
118. See id. at 46-49 (stating that "applying a heightened standard of review
to sentences outside the Guidelines range . . . is inconsistent with . . . the abuse-
of-discretion review. .. .).
119. See id. at 51-52.
120. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91-92 (2007).
121. See id. at 94-100 (describing the origin of ratio and controversy
surrounding it).
122. See id. at 91.
123. See id. at 92-93.
124. Id. at 93. The mandatory minimum on three § 841 counts was ten years
(sentenced concurrently), plus a consecutive five-year mandatory minimum
sentence on a § 924(c) count. See id. at 91-93 & n.3.
125. See id. at 91, 93.
126. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101-03 (2007).
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by that ratio. '2 7 That is, § 841 did not codify a statutorily-
mandated exception to the otherwise-applicable § 3553(a)
analysis.12 8  Consequently, the scaling of sentences by the
ratio was advice from the Guidelines, which the district court
was entitled to reject-"even in a mine-run case" like
Kimbrough's.'2  Two years later, in Spears, a per curiam
opinion issued without oral argument, the Court reaffirmed
its analysis in Kimbrough and explained that not only was a
district court entitled to reject the advice of the Guidelines
based on a policy disagreement with them, but the court also
was entitled to substitute its own ratio which it believed
better served the factors in the § 3553(a) analysis. 13 0
3. The Future of Booker-Rita Reasonableness Review
To some extent, of course, the future of Booker-Rita
reasonableness review rests in the hands of Congress.
Although any statutory amendments would have to comply
with Blakely, lest the Court invalidate them as well, Congress
does have a number of options at its disposal. The most
radical would be to repeal the Guidelines entirely and abolish
the Sentencing Commission, thus restoring sentencing to the
domain of Article III judges. Given Congress' repeatedly
expressed concern with systemic uniformity, however, this
seems to be unlikely. But it could become more plausible if
the Guidelines were to be replaced with data-collection and
information-sharing mechanisms to facilitate greater
consistency among judges. 13 ' Another alternative would be to
reject the conclusion of the Booker remedial majority, and to
ratify the conclusion of the Booker remedial dissent: enacting
legislation to "Blakely-ize" Guidelines facts into verdict facts,
either for all Guidelines facts in all cases or simply for those
127. See id. at 102-03.
128. See id. at 102, 108-10.
129. See id. at 109-10.
130. See Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 841-45 (2009).
131. See Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges:
Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of
Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351 (2005); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright,
"The Wisdom We Have Lost": Sentencing Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 361 (2005); see also, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller,
Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and
Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715 (2008); Michael A. Wolff, Missouri's Information-
Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2006).
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facts required to be verdict facts under Blakely in each
particular case.13 2 To date, however, Congress has shown
little interest in responding to the Court's decisions with new
legislation, 13 3 leaving Booker-Rita reasonableness review in
place for the foreseeable future.
On the Court itself, Booker-Rita reasonableness review
appears to have gained a solid footing. Although the Booker
remedial question was decided five-to-four in 2005, the
majority opinions in Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough each were
joined by at least seven justices. 13 4 The prospect of radical
revision to the Booker-Rita sentencing regime in future
decisions of the Court, then, is probably not very great.
Nonetheless, two strong criticisms of Booker-Rita
reasonableness review persist within the separate opinions in
these cases. One is the challenge raised by Justice Scalia,
arguing that even some Booker-Rita-compliant sentences are
unconstitutional as-applied to the extent they can only be
upheld as reasonable on appeal due to the district court's
reliance on extraverdict facts to justify a lengthier sentence
than would be permissible on the verdict facts alone.13' The
solution, Justice Scalia maintains, is to vest complete
substantive sentencing discretion in the district courts, such
that the verdict facts alone are always adequate to justify any
sentence up to the Apprendi-Blakely maximum.'36
132. See, e.g., Stephen L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54
EMORY L.J. 377, 430-32 (2005); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
277-80, 287, 299, 301-03 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 324-26
(Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 60-61
(2007) (Souter, J. concurring) ("I continue to think that the best resolution ...
would be a new Act of Congress: reestablishing a statutory system of mandatory
sentencing guidelines ... but providing for jury findings of all facts necessary to
set the upper range of sentencing discretion.").
133. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Prior Good Works in the Age of
Reasonableness, 20 FED. SENT'G. REP. 187, 188 (2008) ("Congress has not yet
responded to Booker by adopting a legislative fix that would curtail judicial
sentencing discretion. . . .").
134. See infra Part II.C.
135. See supra Part II.A.3.
136. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 362-84 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Specifically, Justice Scalia argued that appellate courts should
conduct only procedural review of the district court's sentencing, without any
review of the substantive merits of the sentence imposed. See id. at 369-70,
373-75 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Gall and Kimbrough, Justice Scalia accepted
substantive review under Rita as statutory stare decisis. See Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 112-14 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Gall, 552 U.S.
at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Furthermore, if such a solution is necessary to sustain the
constitutionality of lengthy sentences, then the district courts
must be granted equal authority to impose lenient sentences,
because the statutes enacted by Congress cannot fairly be
interpreted to provide for differential standards on the high
and low ends.'3 7 Although to date Justice Scalia's analysis
has not been joined by other justices, his influential role in
prior Apprendi doctrine cases gives pause to dismiss his
argument too quickly.138
The other challenge to Booker-Rita reasonableness
review comes from Justice Thomas. Unlike the other three
justices from the Booker remedial dissent, he stands alone in
refusing to accept the legitimacy of reasonableness review
even with the clarifications provided by Rita.'3 9 In his dissent
in Kimbrough, Justice Thomas criticized the majority's
application of reasonableness review as legislating policy, not
interpreting law-an illegitimate usurpation of legislative
power by the Court.14 0 To bring the courts back within their
proper role, he argues that the Guidelines should be enforced
as mandatory to the maximum extent constitutionally
possible;' 41 in Gall and Kimbrough, this would mean
137. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 373 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Booker, 543
U.S. at 257-58, and arguing that "since reasonableness review should not
function as a one-way ratchet, we must foreswear the notion that sentences can
be too low in light of the need to abandon the concept that sentences can be too
high.").
138. See supra note 53 (discussing Justice Scalia's role). Interestingly,
Justice Thomas initially joined Justice Scalia's analysis concurring in Rita, but
then changed his mind and dissented in Gall and Kimbrough. See Kimbrough,
552 U.S. at 116 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Although I joined Justice Scalia's
dissent in Rita accepting the Booker remedial opinion as a matter of 'statutory
stare decisis,' I am now convinced that there is no principled way to apply the
Booker remedy. .. ."); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 61 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
139. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 114-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Gall, 552 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 114-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 116 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I think it is best to apply the
statute as written, including 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which makes the Guidelines
mandatory."). In light of Justice Thomas' analysis in writing the dissenting
opinion in Harris, however, his argument in Kimbrough "seems more strategic
than genuine." Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 266 n.238. That is,
because Justice Thomas believes Apprendi should apply to mandatory minimum
sentences as well as increased maximum sentences, and consequently he would
extend the constitutional reach of Booker to the low end of Guidelines ranges,
his position in Kimbrough is only viable under the Court's existing decisions,
and not Justice Thomas's own view on the Apprendi doctrine. Id.
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reversing the defendant's sentences for the statutory error of
unauthorized leniency from the Guidelines.14 Thus, he
rejects Justice Scalia's argument based on a legislative goal of
statutory symmetry: Justice Thomas would enforce the
Guidelines on the low end while invalidating them on the
high end (unless the relevant Guidelines facts were
established as verdict facts).14 3  As with Justice Scalia's
criticism of reasonableness review, to date Justice Thomas'
criticism has not been joined by any other justice-but also
like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas has written several highly
influential opinions in prior Apprendi doctrine cases." His
view too, then, must be taken seriously.
C. The Tangled Threads of the Justice's Doctrinal Positions
If the scope and ramifications of the Apprendi doctrine
and Booker-Rita reasonableness review seem overly
complicated and insufficiently reasoned, at least it is not
difficult to determine how this confounding reality has come
about through the Court's decisions. From its origin, this line
of cases has been exemplified by alliances that not only are
atypical among the justices, but also constantly shift in their
membership. It is no surprise, then, that the current Court
appears to have no fewer than six different perspectives on
Apprendi and Booker among the eight justices who have
participated in the decisions to date.
The constitutional principle that became the Apprendi
doctrine first took shape in two 1998 dissents by Justice
Scalia. In these dissents, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Souter, he argued that the defendants'
sentences, enhanced due to recidivism, were unconstitutional
because the requisite facts-the prior convictions-had not
been established as verdict facts in the jury trial.14 5 The
142. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 116 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Applying the statute as written, it is clear that the District Court
erred by departing below the mandatory Guidelines range."); see also Gall, 552
U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. This result is the consequence of Justice Thomas's votes in Kimbrough
and Gall on the one hand, and in Booker on the other, respectively.
144. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 572-80 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499-523 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
145. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S 721, 739-41 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248-49, 258-60
32 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:51
majority opinions, comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, upheld the
sentences under a fundamental fairness analysis.14 6
The following year in Jones, Justice Thomas changed
sides, persuaded by historical evidence about the correct
originalist interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.'4 7 His
action formed the five-to-four bloc that adopted and developed
the Apprendi doctrine from 2000-2005 in the cases of
Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, and the merits opinion in Booker.'48
In each of these cases, the remaining justices continued to
dissent, rejecting the majority's Sixth Amendment analysis
and arguing for fundamental fairness analysis in its place. 4 9
The pro-Apprendi bloc fractured first in 2002, when
Justice Scalia changed sides to uphold the mandatory
minimum sentence in Harris.1o Now in dissent, his erstwhile
allies insisted that the Apprendi doctrine should apply to both
the bottom and top of the sentencing range.15' Despite being
the controlling vote, Justice Scalia did not write separately to
explain his reasons for interpreting the doctrine differently.1 2
The bloc splintered again in 2005, when Justice Ginsburg
parted ways on the issue of the remedy to be ordered in
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 729; Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247. For
discussion of the fundamental fairness analysis followed by these Justices, see
Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 228-30; Priester, Constitutional
Formalism, supra note 18, at 292-96; Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a
"Crime" the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the
Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than
Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 263-66 (1998)
[hereinafter Priester, Sentenced].
147. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999); see also Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining reasons for his changed
vote and repudiating his vote in Almendarez-Torres).
148. Despite the persistence of this majority, however, the Court has not yet
revisited the issue of recidivism sentence enhancements. See supra note 23.
149. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 320-23 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 327-31 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549 (2002).
151. See id. at 575-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. The plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy, however, relies on arguments
previously advanced by Justice Scalia rather than the ones previously advanced
by Justice Kennedy, suggesting that the plurality opinion in fact reflects Justice
Scalia's views although he is not its author. See Priester, Canine Metaphor,
supra note 9, at 233 n.113 (discussing and analyzing the Harris plurality
opinion in this way).
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Booker.'5 3 Although she was the controlling vote, Justice
Ginsburg did not write separately to explain why she joined
Justice Breyer's opinion, rather than Justice Stevens' or
Justice Scalia's.15 4
By the time of the next round of cases in 2007, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito had taken their seats on the
Court. In Cunningham, both seemed to accept the existing
decisions as a given. Chief Justice Roberts joined the bloc
opinion applying Apprendi and Blakely by a six-to-three
margin. 15 While Justice Alito dissented, he analyzed the
issue under the terms of the Booker remedial opinion,'s and
he did not join Justice Kennedy's separate dissent that openly
called for rejecting Apprendi and the Booker merits opinion.Is1
The three cases applying Booker reasonableness review
in 2007 were nominally unremarkable eight-to-one decisions,
but again the justices' underlying disagreements on the
doctrine were readily apparent. In Rita, only Justice Souter
rejected the notion of any presumption of reasonableness to a
Guidelines sentence,' 8 but he subsequently joined the
holdings in Gall and Kimbrough.so Similarly, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg expressed concern in Rita that Booker
reasonableness review must involve meaningfully deferential
appellate review,16 0 but they subsequently wrote the opinions
of the Court in Gall and Kimbrough, respectively.16 ' By
contrast, Justice Scalia remained critical of Booker
reasonableness review in all three cases,162 while Justice
Thomas went further, openly calling for overruling the Booker
remedial opinion.' 63  Among the other justices, Justice
153. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 225 n.***, 244 n.*.
154. See id. at 225 (listing opinions authored by Justices Stevens, Breyer,
Scalia, and Thomas).
155. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 273 (2007).
156. See id. at 297-311 (Alito, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 295-97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In my view the Apprendi
line of cases remains incorrect.").
158. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391-92 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
159. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 60-61 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring).
160. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 363-67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
161. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90; Gall, 552 U.S. at 39.
162. See supra note 136 (explaining the shift in Justice Scalia's arguments
from Rita to Gall and Kimbrough).
163. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 116 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 138 (explaining shift in Justice Thomas' votes from Rita to Gall and
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts joined Breyer's opinion,
and all three of them also joined the holdings in Gall and
Kimbrough without comment.'" But Justice Alito did not
join them; instead, he argued that the Booker remedial
opinion should be read to allow the Guidelines to carry
"significant weight" in sentencing, a position none of the other
justices accepted.'
The decision in Ice in 2009 may have signaled the end of
any reliable voting bloc in this line of cases. The issue in Ice
involved the factfinding that determined whether the
sentences for multiple counts of conviction in the same verdict
would run concurrently or consecutively.1 66 The Court ruled
five-to-four that the judge could make that finding-but with
a different alignment than in any prior decision in this line of
cases. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Apprendi
required jury factfinding, and his analysis was joined by
Justices Thomas and Souter, as well as Chief Justice Roberts
(who, consistent with his vote in Cunningham, appears ready
to follow Apprendi).' Unsurprisingly, Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito voted to allow judicial factfinding. The
decisive votes, then, came from Justice Ginsburg and Stevens,
who rejected Justice Scalia's interpretation of the historical
record and its implications for applying Apprendi to
consecutive sentences.'18  Unlike Booker, this time Justice
Ginsburg wrote the opinion, explaining her divergence from
Justice Scalia's view.
Examining these decisions in the aggregate reveals that
the justices on the Court are deeply divided over the meaning
and application of the Apprendi doctrine and Booker
reasonableness review. In summary:
* Justice Scalia initiated and shaped the Apprendi
doctrine, and maintains that Booker-Rita reasonableness
review has not resolved the constitutional issue.
* Justice Thomas follows Scalia's Apprendi analysis but
Kimbrough).
164. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90; Gall, 552 U.S. at 39; Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007).
165. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 116 (2007) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 61-73 (2007) (Alto, J.,
dissenting).
166. See Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 714 (2009).
167. See id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 714, 716-18 (majority opinion).
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would expand it by overruling Harris, and rejects Booker-Rita
reasonableness review entirely.
* Justice Stevens has voted with Justice Thomas on
Apprendi questions except in Ice, but accepted Booker-Rita
reasonableness review.
* Justice Ginsburg has taken the same positions as
Stevens, except that she joined the Booker remedial majority
instead of the remedial dissent.
* Chief Justice Roberts has joined opinions taking
Scalia's position on the Apprendi doctrine (in Cunningham
and Ice), but follows Breyer's position on Booker-Rita
reasonableness review.
* Justices Breyer continues to oppose the Apprendi
doctrine, but has taken the lead in shaping the nature of
Booker-Rita reasonableness review.
* Justice Kennedy has voted with Breyer in every case-
the only consistently stable alliance in the entire line of cases.
* Justice Alito would go even further than Breyer's
version of Booker-Rita reasonableness review, allowing the
Guidelines to be given even more influence at sentencing.
And of course, now Justices Souter and Stevens have
retired, and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have replaced
them, leaving the future of the doctrine even more in motion
than it already was.
III. APPRENDI LAND AS BIZARRO WORLD: THE COURT'S
SURREAL CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The Apprendi doctrine has been controversial from the
very beginning, and it has only grown more controversial as
the Court has expanded its scope to encompass Blakely-
Booker analysis on merits issues and Booker-Rita
reasonableness review on remedial issues. If the Court takes
the doctrine even further, such as by officially recognizing as-
applied challenges or by overruling Harris, even more
grounds for criticism would arise.
There are many possible angles to examine in evaluating
and critiquing the Court's version of the Apprendi doctrine.
In prior articles, I emphasized two major conceptual attacks
on the Court's reasoning and holdings. Each of these
continues to provide a helpful perspective for illustrating the
significant flaws in the path the Court has taken.
In Structuring Sentencing, I criticized the Court's
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reliance on the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
and argued that the better conceptual justification for the
Apprendi doctrine was the constitutional structure of
criminal procedure. 6 9 While the Court is correct to note the
important roles played by juries in adjudicating guilty and
not guilty verdicts in criminal cases, and by judges in
determining the sentence imposed upon conviction, in
developing the Apprendi doctrine the Court has lost sight of
the important roles played by other actors in determining the
defendant's offense and punishment.'70 In particular, the
offense of conviction depends not merely upon a jury verdict
or guilty plea, but also is a product of the statutes enacted by
the legislature and the charges filed by the prosecutor.' 7'
Similarly, although the judge is the actor who directly
imposes sentence, that authority is constrained not merely by
the scope of the jury's verdict or counts admitted in the plea,
but also by the scope of punishment authorized in the
statutory offenses and the prosecution's charges.17 2  In
viewing the issue as simply one about the allocation of power
between jury and judge, therefore, the Court has given far too
little consideration to the full context surrounding a criminal
conviction, and the division of power among four, not two,
institutions in the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure.1s
In The Canine Metaphor, I proposed a tripartite
analytical framework for assessing relationships of power and
allocations of authority over criminal sentencing, separating
the process of determining an individual defendant's sentence
into three stages. 174 The first stage is the adjudication of
verdict facts, which at a minimum is constitutionally
necessary to determine the defendant's offense of
conviction. " The second stage is the adjudication of
additional, extraverdict sentencing facts that might be
deemed relevant to determining the appropriate punishment
but do not operate to convict the defendant of an aggravated
169. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 885-935.
170. See id. at 891-95.
171. See id. at 891-902.
172. See id. at 891-95, 902-09.
173. See id. at 891-95, 928-34.
174. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 226-27.
175. See id. at 227-34.
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offense.17 The third stage involves the determination of the
normative value of all the various adjudicated facts, by
assessing how much each fact is worth and aggregating the
facts and their respective weights into an ultimate
punishment for the offender."' In developing the Apprendi
doctrine as it has, the Court has gone astray in at least two
significant ways in light of this tripartite framework. For
one, the Court has shifted certain factfinding from the second
stage into the first stage, even though the extraverdict
factfinding did not alter the offense of conviction.1 8  For
another, the Court has asserted exclusively judicial power
over third stage determinations of the normative value of
facts in imposing sentence, without providing an adequate
constitutional justification for prohibiting legislative
involvement in those determinations. 7 9 In its most recent
decisions, the Court has only compounded these problems.
A. Exacerbating the Flaws: Making Even Less Sense Than
Before
When the Court expanded the Apprendi doctrine to
encompass Blakely-Booker and the invalidation of mandatory
sentencing-regulating provisions that increase maximum
sentences, it introduced several significant flaws into its new
constitutional law of sentencing. One major flaw was that the
Court created an absurd formalism in which the identical
finding of fact, with the identical effect on the sentence, would
sometimes be constitutional and would sometimes be
unconstitutional. 8 0  Another flaw was that the Court's
analysis lost its foundation in the jury's role in the
constitutional structure of criminal procedure, instead
focusing on the judge's role in deciding a defendant's fate.'18
Ultimately, the Court imposed its own perspective on optimal
sentencing policy as mandates of constitutional law, when in
fact those policy questions are highly contestable and are not
resolved by the Constitution.' 82
176. See id. at 227, 234-40.
177. See id. at 227, 240-52.
178. See id. at 227-240, 252-62.
179. See id. at 240-59, 262-69.
180. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 222-24.
181. See id. at 224-26.
182. See id. at 260-69.
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Rather than correcting these doctrinal flaws, the Court's
subsequent cases not only have exacerbated them, but also
introduced even more flaws into the Apprendi doctrine.
Although it might not have seemed possible five years ago,
unfortunately the Apprendi doctrine now makes even less
sense than it did before.
1. The Formalistic Absurdities Get More Absurd
The first significant flaw in the Court's current version of
the Apprendi doctrine is that it relies upon a formalism that
produces absurdly inconsistent outcomes. Under the Court's
doctrine, the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
functionally identical extraverdict findings of fact will depend
solely on the Court's formalistic line, not upon any predictable
or identifiable criteria delimiting the sentence imposed upon
the defendant.
Of course, the original version of the Apprendi doctrine
was based on a formalistic rule: an increased sentence based
on an extraverdict fact is unconstitutional if it exceeds the
maximum sentence available under the statutory offense of
conviction by reference to the verdict facts. The dissent in
Apprendi criticized this rule as a "meaningless formalism"
and argued that the statutory offense of conviction carried no
special constitutional significance so long as the punishment
imposed was authorized by any applicable sources of law. 183
This argument was properly rejected by the majority because
enforcing the maximum punishment authorized by the
offense of conviction is necessary to protect the jury's role in
the constitutional structure of criminal procedure." Thus,
the Apprendi doctrine rightfully concludes that, for example,
upon conviction under a burglary statute with a maximum
sentence of ten years, there is a constitutionally important
distinction between extraverdict factfinding that increases
the sentence from four years to six years on the one hand, and
from nine years to eleven years on the other. The distinction
between those two instances of extraverdict factfinding is
formalistic, but it is a formalism which preserves core
183. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 539 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing the rule adopted in the majority opinion as "a
meaningless formalism"). See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10,
at 876, 897; see also Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 228-30.
184. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 896-902.
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constitutional principles.
The merits analysis of Blakely and Booker created the
doctrine's absurd ramifications when it adopted the broader
formalism: an increased sentence based on an extraverdict
fact is unconstitutional if it exceeds the maximum sentence
available under non-offense defining provisions of law,
whether statutory (as in Blakely) or non-statutory (as in
Booker), by reference to the verdict facts. Because this
broader formalism treats differently instances of functionally
identical extraverdict factfinding that relate only to
calculating the sentence within the scope of the offense of
conviction, its application produces two principal absurdities.
One absurdity is intra-jurisdictional: the same finding of
fact with the same sentencing effect will be constitutional in
some cases but unconstitutional in others, even when the
sentence in all those cases is within the scope of the offense of
conviction. 185 For example, suppose the sentencing judge
makes an extraverdict finding that the defendant discharged
a firearm while committing his bank robbery crime, a
statutory offense of conviction carrying a maximum of
twenty-five years. A separate sentencing-regulating
provision, like the federal Guidelines, mandates that the
judge add four years to the sentence, increasing the sentence
imposed from twelve years to sixteen years. Under Blakely-
Booker, that mandatory increase is unconstitutional if the
verdict facts authorized a maximum sentence of fifteen years
under the Guidelines, but constitutional if they authorized a
maximum sentence of twenty years under the Guidelines-
despite the fact that the verdict facts also established an
offense of conviction authorizing up to twenty-five years in
every case.
The other absurdity is inter-jurisdictional: the same
finding of fact with the same sentencing effect will be
constitutional in some states but not in others. 18 That is, if a
mandatory sentencing-regulating provision required the
judge to add four years and expand the top end of the
defendant's otherwise available sentence, then Blakely-
Booker is violated. In another state with purely discretionary
sentencing, however, a sentencing judge may choose to make
185. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 223.
186. See id. at 222-23.
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the extraverdict factfinding of discharging a firearm, and
choose to assign a four year increase to that fact, and yet
Blakely-Booker will not be violated.
In the Court's subsequent decisions applying its Booker
remedial analysis, each of these absurdities produced by the
Court's formalism has only gotten worse. It is difficult to see
how the Apprendi doctrine can survive in its current form
when the Court persists in allowing such profound flaws to
remain embedded deep in its core.
The intra-jurisdictional absurdities produced by Booker-
Rita reasonableness review are probably starker, simply
because they are so bizarre. The consequence of this form of
appellate review is that the identical extraverdict fact with
the identical effect on the defendant's sentence will be
reversed in cases where the appellate court concludes the
sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion, but affirmed in
cases where the appellate court concludes the sentence
imposed was reasonable on the facts of the case.18 7  For
example, if the appellate court concludes that the sixteen year
sentence for bank robbery was unreasonably high compared
to the verdict facts alone, then the four year increase for
extraverdict discharging will be reversed-but if the appellate
court concludes that sixteen years was reasonable for the
verdict facts, then the four years added by extraverdict
factfinding will be upheld. Whether the extraverdict
factfinding was permissible will vary from case to case
depending on the appellate court's judgment about whether
the sentence imposed was reasonable, or instead an abuse of
discretion.
What makes this result all the more absurd, of course, is
that the line between permissible and impermissible
sentences is not something which can be calculated or
identified in advance, but rather is a roving demarcation
contingent on the ad hoc judgments of panels of appellate
judges. At least under Blakely-Booker it is possible for a trial
judge to map over the verdict facts onto mandatory
sentencing-regulating provisions as well as offense-defining
statutes, and thereby figure out the relevant Blakely-Booker
maximum sentence. By contrast, under Booker-Rita
reasonableness review the trial judge will only find out later
187. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining Booker-Rita reasonableness review).
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whether his sentence calculation was permissible. Moreover,
the trial judge may receive divergent feedback from the
appellate courts for functionally identical situations. For
example, a four year sentencing addition for discharging a
firearm may be upheld as reasonable when increasing the
sentence from twelve to sixteen years for a bank robbery
conviction, but reversed as an abuse of discretion when
increasing from three years to seven years on a lesser charge,
such as robbery of a postal carrier.a18
The problem becomes even more apparent when applying
Justice Scalia's position that maintains the operation of
appellate review can itself create as-applied Blakely-Booker
violations.8 ' Under his view, the constitutionally relevant
maximum sentence is created not only by offense-defining
statutes and mandatory sentencing-regulating provisions
together, but also by any decision of an appellate court that
concludes a sentence would not be permissible but for the
presence of certain facts to justify it. That is, extraverdict
factfinding does not raise as-applied constitutional concerns if
it only helps to explain why the trial judge selected the
particular sentence that he did from among the scope of
options on the table; however, if the fact was necessary to
authorize the sentence, in the sense that its finding was
required to avoid reversal, then it must be proven as a verdict
fact.190 To illustrate by returning to the example, if the
sixteen year sentence for bank robbery would be upheld even
without relying on a four year increase specifically
attributable to discharging a firearm, then extraverdict
factfinding was constitutional-but if the sixteen year
sentence would be deemed an abuse of discretion absent the
fact of discharging, then extraverdict factfinding was
unconstitutional.
Ironically, then, extraverdict factfinding is
unconstitutional if it matters, and constitutional only if it is
superfluous. The doctrine has become absurdly formalistic
when the identical finding of fact, with the identical effect on
188. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006) (punishing the offense of bank robbery
by up to twenty-five years' imprisonment), with 18 U.S.C. § 2115 (2006)
(punishing offense of robbery of a postal carrier by up to five years'
imprisonment).
189. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Justice Scalia's position).
190. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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the sentence, has varying constitutionality depending on the
appellate court's ad hoc assessment of reasonableness: if the
court affirms the sentence then the extraverdict factfinding
was constitutional, but if it reverses the sentence then the
extraverdict factfinding was unconstitutional. In other
words, Justice Scalia's position converts every sentencing
increase deemed an abuse of discretion from a reversible error
into a constitutional error by the trial court.
Finally, the Court's applications of Booker-Rita
reasonableness review illustrate the continuing inter-
jurisdictional absurdities produced by the Court's formalism,
as well. For one thing, the Court's cases mean that states
with advisory guidelines or presumptive sentences will have
to implement deferential standards of appellate review
comparable to federal Booker-Rita reasonableness review to
avoid the equivalent Blakely-Booker concerns. On the other
hand, states with discretionary sentencing regimes
apparently can operate under less significant constraints
because they lack any legislatively-imposed sentencing-
regulating provisions. 91  Thus, functionally identical
sentencing factfinding will continue to be treated differently
depending on whether the state uses guided or discretionary
sentencing.1 92
Another inter-jurisdictional absurdity exists because
functionally identical findings of fact will receive divergent
treatment in different states based on nothing more than the
respective state courts' different assessments of the
justifiability of the sentences. For example, one state's
appellate court may conclude that a sixteen year sentence for
bank robbery is justified even absent discharging a firearm,
and therefore uphold the sentence relying on extraverdict
191. But see infra Part III.A.3 (noting that Justice Scalia's position on as-
applied challenges apparently also would apply to discretionary sentencing
regimes).
192. See also Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 222-23 (explaining
this consequence prior to decisions applying Booker-Rita reasonableness
review). Dissenting in Gall, Justice Alito agreed that the Court's version of the
Apprendi doctrine "drew a distinction-between judicial factfinding under a
guideline system and judicial factfinding under a discretionary system-that, in
my judgment, cannot be defended as a matter of principle." Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 64 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). He added that "in both
instances, facts that cause a defendant to spend more time in prison are found
by judges, not juries, and therefore no distinction can be drawn as a matter of
Sixth Amendment principle." Id. at 66.
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factfinding. Another state's appellate court, however, may
conclude that sixteen years is unreasonable unless justified
by a discharging, and therefore reverse the sentence unless
discharging was established as a verdict fact. Thus, just as
with intra-jurisdictional absurdities, the Court assesses the
constitutionality of sentences by a roving line dependent on
ad hoc appellate judgments, not any predictable or calculable
maximum sentence.
It is difficult to see why the Constitution would compel a
principle as flawed as the Court's current version of the
Apprendi doctrine, especially when it produces divergent
rulings on constitutionality in functionally identical
sentencing situations. If the same finding has the same effect
on the sentence, its constitutionality should not depend on ad
hoc judgments of appellate courts rather than predictable or
identifiable criteria.
2. A Fixation on Factfinding: What About the Purposes of
Punishment?
Another flaw in the current version of the Apprendi
doctrine derives from the Court's fixation with extraverdict
factfinding at the expense of other factors also relevant to
determining the appropriate sentence for a given defendant.
By emphasizing so strongly the direct sentencing
consequences of particular facts, the Court inadvertently may
have created an incentive for trial judges to be less specific in
their reasoning, and to rely more heavily on broader and
more amorphous explanations such as the purposes of
punishment. By doing so, sentencing judges may insulate
their judgments from effective appellate review-even though
their actual reasons are functionally indistinguishable from
ones the Court's doctrine would invalidate.
To some extent, of course, the Court's focus on the
specific sentencing effects of particular facts is
understandable given the contexts in which the cases before
the Court arose. In Apprendi and Harris, for example, it was
clear that the additional two years of punishment challenged
by the defendants were attributable to the particular
extraverdict facts of hate-crime motive and firearm
brandishing, respectively. Similarly, in Blakely and Booker it
was possible to mathematically demonstrate the additional
months of punishment attributable to the particular
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extraverdict facts that the judge had found under the
applicable sentencing guidelines.
But not all sentences are based exclusively on an
aggregation of specific effects of particular facts. Instead,
sometimes trial judges rely on broader values such as the
purposes of punishment-most frequently retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation-when imposing
sentence on a defendant. Is such a sentence increase also
subject to challenge under Blakely-Booker analysis or Booker-
Rita reasonableness review? To date, the Court has provided
little indication about the answer.
The danger in the Court's silence is that its current
doctrine's exclusive focus on factfinding creates an incentive
for sentencing judges to revert to more amorphous and less
precise criteria when explaining the sentences they impose.
By doing so, they may insulate their judgments from effective
appellate review-even though their actual reasons are
functionally indistinguishable from ones the Court's doctrine
would invalidate.
Many sentencing decisions based on the purposes of
punishment will rely on factual findings, of course. For
example, a high-end sentence imposed because the judge
concludes that the defendant shows little prospect for
rehabilitation, or is worthy of incapacitation, likely would be
based on facts such as the defendant's history of recidivism or
lack of remorse for his crime."' Similarly, a lengthy sentence
imposed for retributive reasons might be grounded in facts
like the vulnerable nature of the victim or the extensive harm
caused by the crime.19 4  To the extent these kinds of
extraverdict factfinding increase a defendant's sentence, they
already fall within the scope of both Blakely-Booker and
Booker-Rita.
Other sentencing decisions, however, will be grounded in
the purposes of punishment without relying on particular
193. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines increases sentences
dramatically based on the presence of prior convictions. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2009); § 5A (Sentencing Table). Similarly, a
defendant who lacks remorse would be denied the downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility. See § 3E1.1.
194. The Guidelines provide an upward adjustment for a crime against a
vulnerable victim. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2009).
Similarly, the quantity of victim loss in a fraud case can dramatically increase
the sentence. See § 2B1.1.
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facts. The decisions may be based instead on the sentencing
judge's own appraisal of the appropriate application of
principles of moral philosophy and criminology to the
defendant and his crime. The classic example is a lengthy
sentence imposed on a defendant not for reasons of
retribution or any other goal personal to the individual, but to
serve the goal of general deterrence. Such a sentence is
justified by the need to "send a message" that such crimes
will not be tolerated. The recent sentencing of Bernard
Madoff to 150 years in federal prison, for example, was
heavily justified on such grounds.'15 Such a sentence depends
in some sense on the judge's determination that a high
sentence in this case will successfully achieve the goal of
general deterrence, but unlike the fact patterns in the Court's
Apprendi doctrine cases, such a sentence is not based on the
judge's assignment of specific sentencing value to particular
facts about the crime committed or the character of the
defendant himself.
Thus, the Court's emphasis on sentence increases
attributable to extraverdict factfinding of specific facts
inadvertently may create an incentive for trial judges to rely
less on those kinds of sentencing considerations, and more
heavily on generalized assessments of the purposes of
punishment. After all, if a trial judge states on the record
that he imposed a lengthy sentence because the defendant
brandished a firearm at an elderly victim, that justification
may fall within the proscriptions of Blakely-Booker and
Booker-Rita. On the other hand, if the trial judge simply
states on the record in the same case that he imposed a
lengthy sentence based on principles of special deterrence and
incapacitation-to send a message to the defendant that his
cnmes are serious and unacceptable-then the sentence
seemingly withstands scrutiny under the Court's decisions.
The sentencing judge can insulate the sentence from
appellate reversal by keeping his reasons more abstract and
195. See Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 4, United States v.
Madoff, No. 09-Cr.-13 (DC) (S.D.N.Y., June 26, 2009), 2009 WL 1899501
(arguing that 150 years' sentence "forcefully would promote general
deterrence"); Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2009, at Al (noting that the sentencing judge explained that
the 150 years' sentence "would be largely symbolic for Mr. Madoff, who is 71
and has a life expectancy of about 13 years" but justified it by "citing the need
for retribution, deterrence and a measure of justice for the victims.").
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less precise, even though his true reasons for increasing the
sentence are the same, and the sentencing consequence for
the defendant is the same.
One response to this dilemma would be to subject these
more amorphous sentencing considerations to scrutiny under
the Apprendi doctrine. The problem with that solution,
however, is obvious: implementing the purposes of
punishment when imposing sentence is a paradigm example
of what judges, not juries, have always done. Converting
determinations about the applicability of general deterrence
into elements of the jury verdict, or making findings about
non-rehabilitation or incapacitation into admissions in the
defendant's own plea colloquy, turns the history of sentencing
practice on its head.
But if the opposite path is followed-if sentencing
decisions based on the purposes of punishment rather than
particular factual findings are insulated from the Apprendi
doctrine-then the constitutional law of sentencing becomes
even more distorted. Judges who give vague explanations
grounded in moral philosophy will be affirmed, while judges
who cite specific facts in the record will be reversed. The
doctrine would produce the perverse result that sentencing
explanations that are less arbitrary and more transparent
will be more likely to be found unconstitutional. Whatever
else might be true about the constitutional law of sentencing,
that doctrinal outcome would be bizarre, indeed.
The implication of this conclusion is that the scope of the
Court's current Apprendi doctrine reaches too far. The
solution for achieving doctrinal consistency between
sentences based in particular facts and sentences based in
more general considerations is not to extend Apprendi to the
latter, but to apply the limitations of Apprendi less widely to
the former. Extraverdict reliance on the principles of
punishment makes perfect sense when extraverdict reliance
on particular facts is also permissible. Therefore, to avoid
taking its Apprendi decisions even deeper into a doctrinal
morass, the Court should roll back Blakely-Booker and
Booker-Rita and remove the Constitution from many of the
sentencing decisions into which the Court has incorrectly
intruded it.
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3. Protecting the Power of Judges, not Juries, Over
Sentencing
The biggest flaw in the Court's current version of the
Apprendi doctrine, though, may be that the rules
promulgated in the Court's decisions no longer have any
meaningful connection to the purported constitutional basis
of the doctrine: the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Perhaps the Court's rules can be
constitutionally justified on some other basis, but the Court's
expansion of the power of the sentencing judge at the expense
of legislative policy-making has nothing to do with the jury's
role as a check against tyranny. 196
Under the Apprendi doctrine, the jury plays only one role
with respect to sentencing, and it is an indirect one: if the
defendant does not plead guilty, then the jury must
determine the presence or absence of the verdict facts that
operate to constrain the outer limit of the judge's authority to
impose sentence. 9 7 Under Apprendi, the verdict facts
establish the maximum available sentence defined in the
statutory offense of conviction; under Blakely-Booker, the
verdict facts establish the maximum available sentence under
any applicable mandatory sentencing-regulating provisions;
and under Justice Scalia's position on as-applied challenges,
the verdict facts would establish the maximum available
sentence under Booker-Rita reasonableness review. Under
Harris, the minimum possible sentence may be raised
through extraverdict factfinding-and even if Harris were
overruled, the verdict facts still would establish only the very
top and very bottom of the available sentencing range, not
any further limits on the judge's authority to impose any
196. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 224-26 (explaining why
the Court's Blakely-Booker expansion has nothing to do with protecting jury
power at sentencing, but only the sentencing power of judges); see also Bowman,
supra note 1, at 86-89 (describing data showing that Blakely-Booker has not
increased jury power or increased the rate of jury trials). Professor Mandiberg
argues that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right can be interpreted t0 require
judicial discretion at sentencing by viewing it as a rejection of the civil law
system, and concluding that determinate sentencing regimes like the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines too closely resemble the civil law, rather than common
law, system of criminal procedure. See Mandiberg, supra note 15, at 107-08,
114-18, 145-47.
197. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 224-25 (explaining why
the jury's role in sentencing is indirect, not direct).
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particular sentence between them. Hence, regardless of
which version of the Apprendi doctrine is applicable, the only
impact that the jury has on sentencing is derivative of its
power to adjudicate guilt by establishing offense elements as
verdict facts.19 8  The jury plays no role in extraverdict
factfinding, nor in calculating the specific sentence to be
imposed within the outer limit authorized by the verdict
facts. Yet it is precisely those aspects of sentencing-
extraverdict factfinding and determining the specific
sentence-that Blakely-Booker and Booker-Rita were
promulgated to constrain.
The framework of the tripartite analysis of a sentencing
decision exposes this core reality about the Court's current
version of the Apprendi doctrine.199  Undeniably, one
consequence of Blakely-Booker is to require some sentencing-
related facts to be proven as first stage verdict facts rather
than second stage extraverdict facts, and admittedly that
nominally appears to increase jury power at the expense of
judge power. But the reason the Court compelled that
requirement was the third stage impact of the facts found-
specifically, the legislature's attempt to mandate particular
sentencing effects for those facts. After all, the Court
declared the operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional in Booker not because the Guidelines relied
on extraverdict factfinding, but because they imposed
mandatory increases to sentences. This must be true, in fact,
because it is indisputable that, when determining a sentence
increase, an extensive amount of extraverdict factfinding
occurs in the post-Booker regime, and the very existence of
Booker-Rita reasonableness review relies upon it and
validates it. In Rita, for example, the sentencing judge
engaged in extraverdict factfinding in the course of
concluding that the advice of the Guidelines was sound, and a
sentence below the Guidelines recommendation was not
justified on the facts; in Gall, the sentencing judge engaged in
extraverdict factfinding before concluding that a sentence
lower than the Guidelines' advice should be imposed." If it
198. See id. at 225 (explaining the jury's sentencing power as derivative and
secondary).
199. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text (describing the
tripartite analytical framework).
200. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344-46 (2007); Gall v. United
48 [Vol:51
20111 APPRENDI LAND BECOMES BIZARRO WORLD 49
were second stage extraverdict factfinding that was itself
constitutionally problematic, the Court could not have
developed the doctrine as it did.
Instead, what makes advisory-Guidelines-based
extraverdict factfinding permissible, and mandatory-
Guidelines-based extraverdict factfinding unconstitutional, is
the difference between the judge having the discretion to
decide the normative value of the sentencing fact and the
legislature seeking to compel a specific value. The Court's
opinions occasionally make the point overtly, such as when
they emphasize that extraverdict factfinding is
unobjectionable under the Apprendi doctrine if the judge has
power to set the sentencing weight of that fact. 2 01 Thus, it is
safeguarding third stage judicial power-not expanding first
stage jury power over verdict facts, or limiting the second
stage judicial power over extraverdict facts-that has
motivated the Court's decisions expanding the Apprendi
doctrine.202
The Court's Sixth Amendment rhetoric is a charade
because the Apprendi doctrine does not actually give the jury
any sentencing power at all. Instead, the doctrine shields the
sentencing power of judges from legislative encroachment. In
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41-43 (2007).
201. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring). Professor Bowman
makes a similar assessment:
Structured sentencing systems create the tail-wags-dog concern, not
because judges in such systems necessarily identify and consider more
sentence-related facts than they would in a purely discretionary
system, but because the rules of structured systems assign legal
weight-in the form of mandatory or preferred sentencing effects-to
certain judge-found facts.
Bowman, supra note 1, at 90.
202. The Court's current doctrine protects the scope of judicial power over
second stage extraverdict factfinding, as well. For example, one consequence of
making the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory is that sentencing
judges are entitled to consider additional facts beyond those relevant under the
Guidelines, as in Gall, 552 U.S. at 38. Similarly, a sentencing judge might
decide that certain facts made relevant by the Guidelines should not be
considered. In one sense, then, the doctrine ensures that judges can choose
which facts to consider or not consider. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 373 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). But the real import of this power remains at the third stage, the
determination of the normative value of sentencing facts: the power to decline to
consider a fact is equivalent to the power to assign it zero value, and the power
to consider a fact not relevant under the Guidelines is equivalent to the power
to assign it a non-zero value rather than a zero value. Thus, the second stage
implications of the Court's current doctrine implicate the judicial power of policy
nullification, discussed in detail below. See infra Part III.B.
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essence, the doctrine concedes that legislatures may limit the
power of judges through the terms of the offense-defining
statutes that authorize punishments, but imposes significant
restrictions on the use of sentencing-regulating provisions
with extraverdict factfinding to limit the power of judges to
determine a particular defendant's sentence. The Court's
rhetoric claims that the Apprendi doctrine protects jury
power from legislative diminution, but its test for assessing
whether a constitutional violation has occurred is whether
the challenged provision has diminished judicial power.204
Thus, the true consequence of the Court's decisions
expanding the Apprendi doctrine is to constitutionalize a high
degree of judicial power over sentencing at the expense of
legislatures. Those decisions do not increase the power of the
jury over the nuances and details of sentencing
determinations-those intricacies remain subject to judge-
found extraverdict factfinding even under the most expansive
language in the Court's opinions. Instead, the Court's
decisions ensure that those details remain the exclusive
domain of judges, unconstrained by the preferences of the
legislature. Legislatures may set the available penalties for
offenses using verdict facts, but once that scope of
punishment is established, the Court insists that the power to
consider sentencing facts and assess their normative worth
must rest with judges.
And the constitutional doctrine may be even more
restrictive than that, if the full Court follows through in
adopting Justice Scalia's position regarding as-applied
challenges. If he is correct in his constitutional analysis, then
the power to make the determinative third stage decisions of
the normative value of sentencing facts is constitutionally
vested not just in judges in general, but in trial judges in
particular. Under Justice Scalia's analysis, a violation of the
203. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 214-21, 234, 240, 252-
59.
204. See id. at 261.
The Apprendi line of cases sounds in populism, defending
representative, responsive juries against the interference of unelected
sentencing judges. Now, however, the tables are turned, and the Court
is rejecting democratic sentencing laws to preserve the independence
and freedom of those very same unelected sentencing judges. The
turnabout is ironic.
Bibas & Klein, supra note 15, at 781.
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Apprendi doctrine occurs whenever an extraverdict fact was
necessary to justify the increased sentence imposed-and this
principle applies not only to offense-defining statutes or
mandatory sentencing-regulating provisions, but also to the
operation of appellate review.2 05 If a lengthy sentence would
constitute an abuse of discretion under Booker-Rita
reasonableness review but for the presence of certain
additional facts, then those facts are necessary to the
sentence and must be proven as verdict facts rather than
extraverdict facts.
The ramifications of Justice Scalia's analysis are
profound. If he is correct, then abuse of discretion review of
sentencing decisions is not merely a statutory interpretation
solution to the merits holding of Booker, but is in fact
constitutionally mandated in all cases. Under any more
stringent standard of appellate review, far more facts would
become necessary to justify particular sentences, producing
far more as-applied violations of the Apprendi doctrine.
Consider, for example, a sentencing regime that provides for
clearly erroneous review of the trial judge's findings of
sentencing facts but de novo review of the normative value of
those facts and the ultimate length of sentence imposed. In
such a regime, numerous sentences would be subject to
reversal simply because the appellate court weighed the value
of the facts differently 206-including cases in which the
appellate court would order a higher sentence than the lower
court imposed based on a reweighing of the facts. In many
cases in such a regime, the appellate court would approve the
sentence, or order a higher sentence, based on its own
assessment of the value of the facts found at sentencing. Yet
this is exactly what Justice Scalia's constitutional analysis
205. See supra Part II.A.3; see also Bibas & Klein, supra note 15, at 782-84
(criticizing Justice Scalia's position as "too extreme"); Bowman, supra note 1, at
62 (arguing that "the central flaw in Scalia's Blakely view ... is that it amounts
to a declaration that, where judicial sentencing discretion exists, the exercise of
that discretion cannot be subjected to the rule of law."); id. at 70 ("This is the
architect of the Blakely formula declaring that the Constitution prohibits
appellate review of the substance of trial judges' discretionary sentencing
choices.").
206. In Gall, the Court emphasized that such a reweighing of the facts is not
permissible under Booker-Rita reasonableness review. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) ("The fact that the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.").
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forbids: making the finding of extraverdict facts mandatory to
the validity of a sentence. Just as abuse of discretion review
is required to ensure that the Guidelines carry only advisory
weight in a judge's sentencing decision, so too it would also be
required to ensure that appellate court decision-making does
not have the effect of causing extraverdict facts to become
necessary to support particular sentences.2 07 Thus, if the
Court adopts Justice Scalia's constitutional analysis on as-
applied challenges, it will be constitutionalizing not just
judicial power in general to make the determinative decisions
about particular sentences, but specifically trial judge power
over those decisions.
All of this suggests that, while the Court clearly is
undertaking to use constitutional law to solidify judicial
power over sentencing against legislative encroachment, it
also may be simultaneously constitutionalizing a particular
vision of sentencing: the primacy of the interest in the
individualized sentencing of each particular defendant over
the interest in systemic uniformity in the sentencing of all
defendants.2 0 8 In Gall, for example, the Court explained that
the sentencing judge "must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented" and must "'consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a
unique study in the human failings'" that lead to crime.20 9 In
Kimbrough and Spears, the Court authorized sentencing
judges to pursue their own views on appropriate cocaine
sentencing policy, even though that would produce widely
207. Ironically, this doctrinal position would have the effect of mitigating
some of the absurdities resulting from the Court's formalism. See supra Part
III.A.1. Currently, there is a wide gulf between the constitutional restrictions
on sentencing regimes based on mandatory or advisory guidelines and similar
laws on the one hand, and regimes with judicial discretion unregulated by
legislative sentencing-regulating provisions on the other. This discrepancy has
the effect of creating divergences in the constitutionality of functionally
identical sentencing findings as between the two systems. See supra Part
III.A.1. If the Court further expanded its doctrine to encompass Justice Scalia's
position, however, then the same requirement for deferential appellate review
would apply in all systems, and substantial reservations of trial court power
over sentencing would be required in all systems. Although differentials would
remain with respect to Blakely-Booker issues, see supra Part III.A.1, it would
eliminate any differential in the constitutionality of as-applied challenges to the
operation of appellate review.
208. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 260-69.
209. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113
(1996)).
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varying crack-to-powder ratios among different judges. The
Court has not, however, placed similar emphasis on the
notion that sentencing judges should take account of
considerations of systemic uniformity or comparable
treatment of similar cases, but has only mentioned those
considerations tangentially.2 10 Likewise, if legislatures want
to constrain sentencing with considerations of systemic
uniformity, they can only do so in a binding manner using
verdict facts.21 1 Although the Court has not overtly declared
that the Constitution mandates the primacy of individualized
sentencing over systemic uniformity, it seems to be a clear
implication of the Court's reasoning in its decisions
expanding the Apprendi doctrine.
The Court's use of constitutional law to expand judicial
power over sentencing is problematic for several significant
reasons. For one, the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure has never previously been construed to require
exclusive judicial power over determinations of the length of a
defendant's sentence.212 For another, the Court's rule
imposes constraints not only on Congress' power to enact
sentencing-regulating provisions for federal offenses, but also
on each of the fifty state legislatures. The Court thereby has
eliminated much of the opportunity for states to serve their
long-valued salutary role as laboratories of experimentation
210. For example, in Gall the Court maintained that the procedural step of
simply considering the advice of the Guidelines as part of the overall sentencing
determination in and of itself "necessarily gave significant weight and
consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted disparities." Gall, 552 U.S. at
54. Similarly, although the Court in Kimbrough recognized that avoiding
unwarranted disparities is a factor which must be considered under §
3553(a)(6), see Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107-08 (2007), the
Court declared that "some departures from uniformity were a necessary cost of
the remedy we adopted" in Booker, and added that while "district courts must
take account of sentencing practices in other courts," those "disparities must be
weighed against . . . any unwarranted disparity created by the crack/powder
ratio itself." Id. at 108. Dissenting in Gall, Justice Alito commented that the
majority's analysis would "impose few real restraints on sentencing judges" and
consequently "sentencing disparities will gradually increase." Gall, 552 U.S. at
63-64 (Alito, J., dissenting).
211. Options for limiting judicial sentencing authority using verdict facts
might include statutory mandatory minimum sentences in offense-defining
statutes, narrower punishment ranges in offense-defining statutes, or a highly
detailed criminal code similar to "Blakely-ized" Guidelines. See Priester,
Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 921-23, 929-34; Priester, Canine
Metaphor, supra note 9, at 247-52.
212. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 891-96, 928-34.
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for public policy.2 13  For example, the Court has precluded
states from experimenting with sentencing regimes such as
discretionary sentencing with de novo review, or presumptive
sentences with deferential review.2 14 If the constitutional
arguments in favor of the Court's rule were stronger, perhaps
its claims would have more force. Instead, the Court's
decisions seem less like persuasive constitutional analysis
and more like a self-interested institutional power-grab.2 1 5
B. Policy Nullification: The Ultimate Judicial Power-Grab
In criminal trials, jury nullification has long-standing
significance. 2 16 Even though it is controversial-it does, after
all, allow jurors to reject the judge's instructions and acquit
clearly guilty defendants against the weight of the evidence-
we retain jury nullification in our criminal justice system
because it preserves an anti-tyranny mechanism we value
more than the prevention of the occasional imprudent or
undeserved acquittal. 21 7  As the Court has emphasized from
the beginning of this line of cases, the Apprendi doctrine's
"animating principle is the preservation of the jury's historic
role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the
trial for an alleged offense."2 18 When the criminal law or its
213. See, e.g., Berman & Bibas, supra note 17, at 38-39, 40-42, 62-72.
214. See, e.g., id. at 63-65, 70-71.
215. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 260-66 (arguing that
Blakely-Booker constitutes an illegitimate institutional power-grab).
216. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L.
REV. 253 (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification".- When
May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239
(1993).
The critical feature of nullification is the jurors' decision to acquit even
though they believe the defendant committed acts that met the
statutory definition of the crime. Thus, for example, a jury might agree
that the defendant knowingly possessed a small amount of illegal
drugs, but nevertheless acquit because it believes sending the
defendant to jail would be too harsh. By acquitting, the jury has
'nullified' the drug possession law, at least for that case.
Leipold, supra, at 253-54 n.1.
217. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE
L.J. 951, 959-63, 992-99 (2003); Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1012-17 (2006). For mention of several
controversial acquittals in the early 1990s, see Leipold, supra note 216, at 254-
55 & nn.2-5 (discussing Marion Barry, Jack Kevorkian, and Oliver North).
Another example often mentioned as jury nullification is, of course, the
acquittal of O.J. Simpson in 1995.
218. Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 717 (2009) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey,
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enforcement is unjust, the jury can prevent an injustice.
In criminal sentencing, on the other hand, the power of
the judge to actively thwart the enforcement of the law is far
more constrained. When the legislature has enacted an
offense, the prosecution has charged it, and the jury has
convicted, we ordinarily expect the judge to impose a fair,
reasoned sentence upon the defendant.219 Sometimes a
higher end or lower end sentence is justified on the facts of
the case, such as when the government persuades the judge
that the offender is particularly blameworthy or the defense
persuades the judge that the offender is worthy of mercy.2 20
Other times the judge may more overtly disagree with the
actions of another actor, such as when a sentencing judge
believes the prosecution has "over-charged" the case relative
to the defendant's actual culpability and consequently
imposes a low-end sentence over the government's
objection.2 2 1  When it comes to legislative enactments,
however, we typically describe a sentencing judge as engaged
in the enterprise of applying the law to pass judgment on the
offender, and not using the offender's case to pass judgment
on the law.222
Yet in recent cases, the Court has apparently staked a
claim to judicial constitutional power to engage in exactly this
kind of "policy nullification," seemingly granting to federal
judges unbridled authority to reject the criminal justice policy
decisions made by Congress in favor of their own policy
preferences. And this power would seem to rest not in federal
judges institutionally, acting in the aggregate, but-due to
the operation of Booker-Rita reasonableness review-in each
530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)); see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244-48
(1999) (citing, among others, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES).
219. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 891-95
(describing the constitutional structure of criminal procedure).
220. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing the 150 year
sentence imposed on Bernard Madoff).
221. See Stephanos Bibas, Pleas' Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1039
(2004) (noting that, under pre-Booker Guidelines, "[pirosecutors can overcharge
to gain leverage for harsh sentences, and judges have little power to check
prosecutorial harshness. If judges try to cut sweet deals unilaterally, say by
departing from the Guidelines, they face appellate reversal.").
222. Historically, judges did have several tools for mitigating harsh sentences
mandated by legislatures. See Mandiberg, supra note 15, at 118-23 (discussing
technical common law procedural rules, benefit of clergy, suspended imposition
of sentences, and recommendation for executive pardon).
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individual federal judge in each particular case. Given the
narrow, fact-bound nature of the decisions to date with policy
nullification ramifications, it is possible the Court will not
follow its rhetoric and rationales through to their logical
conclusion. But given the trajectory of the Apprendi doctrine
so far, and the Court's willingness to use those cases to grab
power for the judiciary,2 23 it is also entirely possible that the
Court will use a future case to solidify definitive judicial
authority to engage in policy nullification at sentencing.
1. What Counts as Policy Nullification? The Case of
Letter versus Spirit
Before examining the extent to which the Court may be
constitutionalizing a judicial power to engage in policy
nullification at sentencing, it is necessary to define what kind
of judicial actions qualify as policy nullification. One option
would be to define the phrase narrowly, by close analogy to
jury nullification: that is, a judge engages in policy
nullification only when the judge rejects a specific legislative
policy expressly enacted in a sentencing-regulating statute.
Under this definition most sentencing decisions would not
constitute policy nullification, because such specific
legislative policy choices tend to be rare. Another option
would be to define policy nullification more broadly: a judge
engages in policy nullification whenever the judge's
sentencing decision is inconsistent with implicit legislative
policy choices. Under this definition, by contrast, many more
sentencing determinations would constitute policy
nullification, because the scope of the field of issues implicitly
addressed by the legislature is far wider. Thus, the former
definition emphasizes the letter of the law, while the latter
focuses on the spirit.
The Court's decisions to date have involved technical
compliance with the letter of the statutes enacted by
Congress. In Gall, the district judge imposed a lower
sentence based in part on the defendant's college-student age,
his emotional immaturity at the time of his offense, and his
strong family ties at the time of sentencing.2 24 Under the
223. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 261-62 (discussing the
Court's decisions as a power-grab).
224. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 43-45, 57-58 (2007).
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Guidelines, such considerations are prohibited when
calculating a sentence;22 5 but that prohibition is only a
determination of the Sentencing Commission, not a statutory
policy enacted by Congress.2 2 6 Consequently, when the Court
upheld the sentence as reasonable under Booker-Rita, it
ratified the district judge's rejection of the Commission's
advice, not a repudiation of a specific sentencing policy
adopted either expressly or impliedly by Congress. 2 27  The
same was nominally true in Kimbrough, where the district
judge sentenced Kimbrough to the statutorily-mandated
minimum sentence required for the quantities of crack and
powder cocaine to which he had admitted in his guilty plea,
thereby complying with the 100:1 ratio as codified in the
letter of the statute enacted by Congress.22 8 The judge
refused to impose the longer sentence recommended by the
Guidelines, however, based on the judge's rejection-as bad
policy-of the Commission's decision to incorporate the 100:1
ratio across the full range of cocaine sentences. 2 29 The Court
upheld the sentence, concluding that the district judge was
entitled to reject the advice of the Guidelines based on policy
disagreement with the ratio.2 3 0 As a technical matter, then,
both cases only involved the Commission's sentencing advice,
not a specific sentencing policy expressly enacted by
225. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1 & 1.6 (2009).
226. In the statutes creating the Sentencing Commission and its authority to
promulgate the Guidelines, Congress instructed the Commission "to establish
uniform national sentencing policies" regarding age and family ties, as well as a
number of other disputed sentencing considerations. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 69-
70 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) and the Commission's
actions pursuant to it). It was therefore the Commission, not Congress, that
adopted the Guidelines rule that age and family ties were not ordinarily
relevant to sentencing. See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 5H1.1 & 1.6.
227. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 58 ("[I]t was not unreasonable for the District
Court to view Gall's immaturity at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor,
and his later behavior as a sign that he had matured .. ."). Cf. id. at 69 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (stating that the district judge's consideration of Gall's age and
immaturity "amounted to a direct rejection of the Sentencing Commission's
authority to decide the most basic issues of sentencing policy.").
228. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 92-93 & n.3 (2007)
(explaining defendant's guilty plea admissions and sentenced imposed); id. at
102-03 (noting that text of statute creates only mandatory minimums and "says
nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets").
229. See id. at 93, 110-11 (describing district court's rejection of Guidelines
sentence under § 3553(a) analysis).
230. See id. at 100-10.
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Congress.
Unlike Gall, however, where Congress had taken no
position on the issue, in Kimbrough the courts' ignoring of the
ratio in calculating the sentence arguably rejected a policy
impliedly adopted in the offense-defining statute: that crack
sentences should be considerably more severe than powder
sentences. The Government advanced a stronger version of
this argument in Kimbrough, urging the Court to conclude
that the three-tiered § 841 offense "implicitly requires" the
identical 100:1 ratio to be applied in sentences pursuant to
the Guidelines and § 3553(a), as well.2 3 ' The Court disposed
of this argument by reasoning that the text of the three-tiered
offense statute "says nothing about the appropriate sentences
within these brackets, and we decline to read any implicit
directive into that congressional silence."2 32 This is, of course,
a non-sequitur: every argument by implication necessarily
arises from an issue not expressly addressed in a text. The
question the Court needed to address was whether the
inference about sentencing policy the Government sought to
draw from the offense definition was a good one-that is,
whether the inference was justified in the full interpretive
context. The Court mentioned several relevant
considerations on that score, such as prior precedent and the
history of Commission proposals to alter the ratio in the
Guidelines, but specifically addressed them only in the
context of rejecting the Government's argument for the
identical 100:1 ratio.23 3
The Court did not address, however, the possibility that
the § 841 offense might carry a weaker but still meaningful
implication about sentencing: specifically, that crack
sentences should be considerably more severe than powder
sentences. Even if Congress did not necessarily intend for the
231. See id. at 102 (internal quotations omitted).
232. Id. at 103.
233. See id. at 103-06. The Court drew an analogy to its prior cases
involving the conflicting statutory tiers and Guidelines provisions for
determining the quantity of LSD to be used in determining the sentence. See
id. at 103-05 (discussing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) and
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)). The Court also noted that
Congress had rejected a Commission proposal for a 1:1 Guidelines ratio in 1995,
but had allowed a 2007 amendment for a reduced Guidelines ratio (varying from
25:1 to 80:1 depending on quantity) to take effect. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at
105-06.
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exact ratio from the offense statute to be used reflexively in
the sentencing calculation in each particular case, surely the
fact that the offense differentiates the severity of crack and
powder offenses by two orders of magnitude implies at the
very least that it is inappropriate for a sentencing judge to
impose sentence based on no differentiation between them.
Perhaps the 20:1 ratio adopted by the district court in Spears
would be consistent with a weaker implication of the offense
statute, or perhaps not. But even if that were the case, the
Court did not revisit its terse analysis in Kimbrough,
either.234 Consequently, in Kimbrough and Spears the Court
upheld the district courts' policy rejection of the 100:1 ratio
without giving adequate consideration to the sentencing
policies embodied in the spirit, if not the letter, of the statutes
adopted by Congress.
The Court's rulings in Gall and Kimbrough, therefore,
seem to recognize judicial authority to engage in policy
nullification in the broader definitional sense. That is, so
long as the sentencing judge has complied with any applicable
express statutory directives of Congress, the Court maintains
that the judge is free to follow whatever sentencing policies
the judge sees fit. But is this right? Is it a fair statement of
judicial power at sentencing? Put another way, is the Court
actually correct in Kimbrough to conclude that complete
repudiation at the sentencing stage of the crack-to-powder
ratio required to be enforced at the conviction stage is
legitimate judicial action? In its opinions, the Court seems
simply to assume that this form of policy nullification is
legitimate, without seriously addressing the consequences or
ramifications of recognizing such judicial power.
If the Court does mean to gives its imprimatur to policy
nullification in the broader sense, and sentencing judges are
not at all constrained by the spirit of the criminal law but
only by its letter, then the potentially significant
consequences are not difficult to foresee. What, then, is to
prevent one district judge from concluding that
criminalization of gun offenses shows insufficient respect to
the fundamental importance of gun rights to American
society, and from consequently imposing low-end sentences on
every gun conviction in his courtroom-while another district
234. See Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 842-44 (2009) (per curiam).
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judge concludes that illegal use of firearms in crime
undermines the legitimate gun rights of law-abiding citizens
in the face of clamor for gun control, justifying high-end
sentences for every gun crime? Those were the very kind of
divergent sentencing policy decisions that led to the creation
of the Guidelines in the first place. Yet if policy
nullification is legitimate at the level of each sentencing
judge, then the proliferation of such divergences is inevitable.
Similarly, if policy nullification is permissible, then
nothing prevents a district judge from concluding that
marijuana criminalization is bad policy and consequently
imposing the lowest available sentence in every marijuana
case. As in Kimbrough, such a judge clearly would be
complying with the letter of the law-and just as clearly
violating its spirit. After all, it is one thing to impose a lower-
than-typical sentence when the judge believes the particular
facts of the given case are far removed from typical."3 Such a
sentence is simply a good faith application of the law to the
facts-even if the judge might be "wrong" that the facts of the
case actually are atypical. But it is something else entirely to
impose a lower-than-typical sentence in every case of a certain
type because the judge thinks the legislature made bad
policy. That is not a good faith application of the law; it is a
refusal to apply the law simply because the judge believes the
law should be different. Does that not constitute an iconic
instance of the judge acting as super-legislature, which judges
are generally thought to be institutionally obligated to
avoid? 237  The Court in Gall and Kimbrough, however,
235. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 69-70 (2007) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (discussing reasons why Congress directed the Commission to
standardize judicial consideration of factors, like age and family ties, that
received divergent consideration by different judges).
236. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (explaining that "a district court's
decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when
the sentencing judge finds a particular case outside the heartland to which the
Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.") (internal quotations
omitted); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 43-45, 59-60 (noting that a sentence of
probation was atypical, but affirming the sentence as not an abuse of discretion
on the facts under Booker-Rita reasonableness review).
237. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27-28 (2003).
To be sure, California's three strikes law has sparked controversy.
Critics have doubted the law's wisdom, cost-efficiency, and
effectiveness in reaching its goals. This criticism is appropriately
directed at the legislature, which has primary responsibility for making
the difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing
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apparently authorizes sentencing judges in criminal
sentencing to do exactly that.
Perhaps the Court believes that judges' consideration of
the § 3553(a) factors will prevent many instances of policy
nullification, but that possible constraint would appear to be
foreclosed by the Court's own analysis in Kimbrough. In
upholding the district court's refusal to apply the crack-to-
powder ratio in calculating the sentence, the Court expressly
stated that the sentencing judge was entitled to replace the
Commission's assessment of the § 3553(a) factors with its own
assessment "even in a mine-run case."238 The Court
reaffirmed this conclusion in Spears, emphasizing that
"district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically
from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy
disagreement with those Guidelines."2 3 9 Thus, so long as the
sentence was in technical compliance with congressional
directives by following the statutory mandatory minimum
sentence, the Court believed that the judge was authorized to
conclude that applying the ratio was bad sentencing policy
under § 3553(a). Perhaps the Court's interpretation of §
3553(a) is correct, and the statute does contemplate that
sentencing judges will in some cases engage in technical
compliance plus policy nullification, rather than a good faith
effort to follow the spirit as well as the letter of the law. But
scheme. We do not sit as a 'superlegislature' to second-guess these
policy choices.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
238. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (noting that "closer review
may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based
solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range 'fails properly to reflect §
3553(a) considerations' even in a mine-run case.") (quoting Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)); id. at 110 (explaining that "it would not be an
abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular
defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence greater than
necessary to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in a mine-run case."). In Spears,
the district judge substituted a ratio of 20:1 instead of a ratio of 100:1. See
Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 842.
239. Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843-44; see also id. at 843 ("That was indeed the
point of Kimbrough: a recognition of district courts' authority to vary from the
crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not
simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive
sentence in a particular case."). As in Kimbrough, the defendant in Spears
received the statutory mandatory minimum sentence (240 months) for the
quantities of crack and powder cocaine established as verdict facts, a sentence
that fell well below the Guidelines sentence using the 100:1 ratio (324-405
months). See id. at 841-42.
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that interpretation requires reading § 3553(a) in isolation, as
a mere regulation of sentencing authority divorced from any
connection to the substantive offense upon which sentence is
being imposed-and it is certainly not clear that Congress
would have intended § 3553(a) to encompass sentencing
policy nullification. The Court likely should have undertaken
briefing and argument on the question, rather than simply
assuming that its construction of § 3553(a) is correct.
Another possibility is that the Kimbrough Court believes
its language authorizing policy nullification will not be
elaborated and extended by the lower courts because it is
limited to the particular context of the highly controversial
crack-to-powder ratio. At first blush, this might be plausible:
the Spears opinion, for example, describes the holding of
Kimbrough only in terms of the crack-to-powder ratio.2 40
Likewise, the Kimbrough opinion contains an extensive
discussion of the many criticisms of the ratio and efforts to
change it,24 1 including emphasizing that the Guidelines ratio
was adopted merely by transposing the offense-statute's ratio
rather than a separate consideration of sound sentencing
policy. 2 4 2 This might suggest, then, that district judges are
authorized to engage in policy nullification only for highly
contestable or empirically dubious policy decisions, but not in
more mundane situations.' But that window may be nearly
impossible to close: after all, surely it would not be difficult
for the marijuana-nullifying judge to marshal the full range
of well known pro-legalization arguments to support an
argument that the application of the § 3553(a) factors points
toward a rejection of congressional policy even in the mine-
run case.244 For example, the empirically and normatively
240. See, e.g., id. at 843 ("Kimbrough thus holds that with respect to the crack
cocaine Guidelines, a categorical disagreement with and variance from the
Guidelines is not suspect.") (emphasis added).
241. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 94-100.
242. See id. at 96-97; id. at 109 ("The crack cocaine Guidelines, however,
present no occasion for elaborative discussion . . . because those Guidelines do
not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role.").
243. But cf Adelman & Dietrich, supra note 15 (discussing four additional
Guidelines provisions with which district judges might also find significant
policy flaws); Bibas & Klein, supra note 15, at 775-76 (concluding that
Kimbrough's reasoning is not limited to the crack-to-powder Guideline);
Bowman, supra note 1, at 74-75, 80 (concluding that implications of Kimbrough
for other Guidelines are unclear).
244. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Liberty Lost: The Moral Case for
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based arguments that marijuana causes less, or at least no
worse, social harm than alcohol consumption or tobacco
cigarette smoking would be relevant to sentencing purposes
such as retribution and deterrence, as well as to avoiding
unwarranted disparities.245 These are, of course, the very
same kinds of arguments marshaled in favor of abolishing the
crack-to-powder ratio for cocaine offenses.24 6
It seems likely, though, that the Court considers policy
nullification as manifested in Gall and Kimbrough to be an
integral part of the sentencing discretion vested in district
judges by Booker-Rita reasonableness review. Consequently,
addressing the legitimacy of policy nullification in the broad
sense-when sentencing judges comply with the letter of the
law but, at least arguably, not its spirit-is a necessary
discussion.
Yet even beyond that discussion is a deeper set of
ramifications in the Court's policy nullification decisions. If
the principles of the Court's holdings in Blakely-Booker are
followed to their logical conclusions-especially if the doctrine
is expanded to include Justice Scalia's position regarding as-
applied challenges-then the Court will sanction not only the
broad form of policy nullification, but the narrow form, as
well. In other words, the Court may very well be poised to
rule unconstitutional a legislative attempt to use the letter of
the law to statutorily prevent policy nullification.
2. The Constitutional Implications of Policy Nullification
Under Apprendi Doctrine
Whatever the bounds of judges' authority to pursue their
own determinations of sentencing policy when the legislature
has spoken only impliedly, if at all, on the matter in question,
judicial policy nullification would rise to another degree
entirely if judges also had the power to ignore express
declarations of legislative sentencing policy. Although the
Court has not yet overtly suggested that the Apprendi
doctrine compels the recognition of that power, the rhetoric
and rationales of the Court's decisions point strongly in that
direction. It would not be surprising, then, to see the Court in
Marijuana Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 279, 283-89 (2010).
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) & (6) (2006).
246. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93, 97-99, 108, 109-11.
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a future case strike down as unconstitutional a statute which
seeks to enforce a specific legislative policy upon sentencing
judges.
How could such a dispute over specific sentencing policy
arise? The facts of Gall provide a good example, where the
problematic factors of the defendant's age and family ties are
in play. Prior to the Guidelines, there was little uniformity in
how sentencing judges considered these factors.24 7 Some
judges might consider young age to be a mitigating factor due
to immaturity and bad judgment, while others might consider
an older age to be an aggravating factor because a more
mature grown-up should have known better.2 48  Similarly,
some judges treated the defendant's family ties as a
mitigating factor due to the negative collateral consequences
of the defendant's incarceration on his family, while other
judges viewed those consequences as grounds to punish the
defendant more severely for selfishly making his family suffer
for his crimes.2 4 9 The Guidelines sought to achieve systemic
uniformity on these factors by deeming both of them "not
ordinarily relevant" to calculating the defendant's sentence.2 50
After Booker, those Guidelines proscriptions are now advisory
and sentencing judges are entitled, as in Gall, to once again
take those factors into account in determining a sentence.
But what if Congress still values systemic uniformity on
these factors? The Guidelines may be advisory, but statutes
are not. What would be the constitutional implications if
Congress sought to expressly legislate specific statutory
sentencing policies regarding the consideration of age and
family ties? The Apprendi doctrine already imposes
constitutional constraints on certain types of legislative
mandates, but the existing doctrine is silent on others.
For example, imagine Congress concluded that the "you
should have known better" perspective on age and family ties
247. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 70 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
248. See Bibas et al., supra note 15, at 1388-89 (noting that some judges
considered youthful age to be a mitigating factor, while others considered it an
aggravating factor).
249. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 70 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that some judges
considered family ties as mitigating circumstance due to family's ability to
assist offender in rehabilitation to avoid re-offending).
250. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1 & 1.6 (2009); see
also Gall, 552 U.S. at 69-70 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining the origin of these
Guidelines provisions).
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was the better sentencing policy, and sought to impose that
policy uniformly for all federal sentences. If Congress sought
to implement it with mandatory sentence increases-whether
by a fixed number (such as six additional months) or a
percentage (such as an additional twenty percent) compared
to the otherwise applicable sentence-based on a finding of
the defendant's age or family ties, then those facts would
have to be established as verdict facts to avoid
unconstitutionality under Apprendi and Blakely-Booker.2 51
Similarly, if Harris is overruled, then a mandatory minimum
provision achieving the same objective also would require
proof as a verdict fact.252
But what if Congress simply wished to ratify and codify-
and make mandatory rather than advisory-the policy
selected by the Commission in the Guidelines, that age and
family ties are ordinarily not to be considered in determining
a sentence? To make its intention clear, and to avoid any
interpretive debate of the kind seen in Kimbrough, Congress
might pass a statute expressly declaring: "When determining
a sentence pursuant to § 3553(a), the defendant's age and
family ties shall not ordinarily be relevant." Is such a statute
constitutional?
The prohibition would pass muster under the terms of
the Apprendi doctrine cases to date, of course. Most
obviously, the statute does not involve an affirmative finding
of fact, so by definition it cannot produce a sentencing result
in which extraverdict factfinding increased a maximum
sentence. Even Justice Scalia's concern about as-applied
challenges to Booker-Rita reasonableness appellate review is
limited to situations in which additional extraverdict facts
are used to justify longer sentences. This statute, then, would
not contravene the scope of the current Apprendi doctrine.
Yet the statute surely seems to raise Apprendi doctrine
implications, because it presents the converse situation of
those decisions. In many cases, the statutory prohibition
would operate to mandate a longer sentence than that would
otherwise be imposed by the judge. Just as the extraverdict
251. Proof as a verdict fact is required if the fact will be used to increase a
statutory maximum sentence or a binding maximum sentence from a
sentencing-regulating provision. See supra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing Apprendi
and Blakely-Booker).
252. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Harris).
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findings in Blakely and Booker mandated longer sentences
than would have been imposed based on the verdict facts, the
statutory prohibition on considering age and family ties
would mandate a longer sentence in Gall than would have
been imposed if the judge were permitted to consider those
facts.
Why, then, should the Court distinguish for Apprendi
doctrine purposes between a statute that mandates
sentencing increases and a statute that prohibits sentencing
decreases? The net effect is the same: in both Blakely-Booker
on the one hand, and Gall on the other, the operation of the
sentencing provision takes away the judge's authority to
impose a shorter sentence on the defendant.
Consistent with its rationale in Apprendi doctrine
decisions, therefore, the Court might very well declare
unconstitutional such a statutory prohibition. The doctrinal
principles from Apprendi and Blakely-Booker constrain
legislatures into using verdict facts to determine or increase
the top end of the sentence that may be imposed-and, if
Harris is overruled, the bottom end as well. The application
of Booker-Rita reasonableness review, ensuring that the
Apprendi doctrine is not violated when sentences are
imposed, has furthered emphasized that the Guidelines must
be truly advisory to avoid unconstitutionality. It is hardly a
doctrinal shift to synthesize these cases into a rule providing
that the legislature may limit judicial sentencing power
through mandatory limits imposed by verdict facts, but
within those limits sentencing judges retain full discretion to
impose any available sentence-and correspondingly, any
legislative attempt to constrain that sentencing discretion,
either by a mandatory provision relying on specific
extraverdict factfinding or by a mandatory provision
prohibiting specific extraverdict factfinding, is an
unconstitutional interference with judicial power.
Such an expansion of the Apprendi doctrine to encompass
policy nullification of express statutory policies is not a
foregone conclusion, however. One core rationale of the
Apprendi doctrine has been that extraverdict sentence
enhancements are unconstitutional because they deprive the
defendant of a guaranteed lower sentence; that is, absent the
application of the extraverdict enhancement, the defendant
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would have been "entitled" to a lower sentence.25 3 The
application of a statutory prohibition on considering age or
family ties, by contrast, only deprives the defendant of the
opportunity for a lower sentence, because there is no certainty
that the judge would have imposed a lower sentence in the
case if consideration of those factors had been permissible.
Accordingly, the Court might distinguish mandatory
enhancements from mandatory prohibitions, and find the
latter to be constitutional.
In addition, so long as Harris remains good law the Court
may be reluctant to expand the Apprendi doctrine to
invalidate statutory prohibitions. The primary basis on
which the Harris plurality distinguished Harris from
Apprendi was that the mandatory minimum provision only
operated to limit the judge's sentencing discretion within the
range of sentences already authorized by the verdict facts, in
contrast to a maximum-enhancing provision that operates to
exceed the sentence authorized by the verdict facts.2 54 Like a
statute expressly imposing a specific mandatory minimum
sentence, a statutory prohibition on considering age or family
ties would not extend the upper limit of the sentence, but only
constrain the judge's range of choices beneath that maximum.
Consequently, so long as the holding of Harris remains
controlling, the Court might view Harris, rather than
Apprendi-Blakely, as the closer analogy to a statutory
prohibition.2 55
253. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501, 520-22 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 113-14 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 721 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549-50, 556-68 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
255. On the other hand, this example of the statutory prohibition illustrates
why the holding in Harris has tenuous validity as the Apprendi doctrine has
expanded. As the Court has increasingly expanded judicial power at sentencing
at the expense of the legislature, the preservation of Harris looks more like an
"exception" to Apprendi-Booker than it does a definitional component of the
rule. Cf Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 225-27, 261-63, 270
(criticizing Court's expansion of Apprendi-Harris into Blakely-Booker); Priester,
Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 904-09 (arguing that Apprendi-Harris
rule is constitutionally justified). After all, if the doctrine is expanded from a
rule providing that "the legislature may not mandate that judges use specific
extraverdict facts to extend the upper limit on a sentence" to a rule providing
that "the legislature may not mandate that judges not use specific extraverdict
facts in determining a sentence," then it would seem to follow that the rule
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If the Court does expand the Apprendi doctrine into a
rule excluding all legislative attempts to impose binding
constraints on the exercise of judicial discretion within the
sentencing range established by verdict facts, then the Court
will be authorizing policy nullification in its strongest form: a
judge's power to ignore express declarations of legislative
sentencing policy. Once the boundaries of the judge's
authority are determined, the legislature may not further
constrain the judge's determination of the appropriate
sentence. Alternatively stated, the legislature may
implement its desired policies by using verdict facts to limit
the sentencing range available to the judge-but once those
limits are established, the legislature's role in sentencing is at
an end.
Moreover, the rhetoric in the opinions in the Court's
decisions may even imply that this constitutional proscription
against constraining sentencing discretion applies not only to
constraints imposed by legislatures, but also to limits on trial
court discretion imposed by appellate courts through the
operation of appellate review. That is, sentencing policy may
be vested not merely in judges rather than legislatures, but
specifically in trial court judges. The most prominent rhetoric
is inherent in the definition of Booker-Rita reasonableness
review laid out in Booker, Rita, and Gall: to avoid Booker
violations, and to ensure that the Guidelines are truly
advisory, the appellate courts are permitted to review the
substantive merits of the sentence only for an abuse of
discretion. 256 In Gall, the Court emphasized that "[t]he fact
that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded
that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to
justify reversal of the district court."2 57 Hence, an appellate
court cannot reverse based on its view that the trial court
made a flawed or unwise decision of sentencing policy;
instead, it can reverse only if it concludes that the trial
court's sentencing policy decision was entirely out of bounds.
Consequently, under Booker-Rita reasonableness review,
appellate courts are precluded from using their powers of
appellate review to enforce uniformity and consistency in
simply is "the legislature may not mandate that judges use specific extraverdict
facts in determining a sentence."
256. See supra Part II.B.2.
257. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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sentencing policy decisions by trial judges, except in the most
outlying cases-this has the effect of making all but the most
outrageous sentencing policy determinations by trial judges
impervious to attack. The ramifications are even greater if
the Court adopts Justice Scalia's position regarding as-
applied challenges, maintaining appellate review also creates
Apprendi doctrine violations to the extent that some
sentences would only be upheld on appeal based on
extraverdict facts.2 58  Thus, because the highly deferential
standard of review of trial court sentencing decisions has
constitutional moorings in the necessity of avoiding Apprendi
doctrine violations, the constitutional implication for policy
nullification is the same: the power rests in the hands of trial
courts specifically.
An expansion of the Apprendi doctrine to
constitutionalize a judicial power of policy nullification would,
at its core, be nothing less than an assertion that the
legislature does not have power to make sentencing policy
directly-only to make offense-definition policy that
constrains sentencing indirectly. Such a rule is a plausible
reading of the implications of the Court's decisions to date.
Whether it is a plausible reading of the Constitution is
another matter.
Will the Court take the Apprendi doctrine to this full
extent? It is possible, but by no means certain. Yet that path
also cannot be ruled out-which is problematic enough on its
own.
3. Why Policy Nullification Is Bad Constitutional Law
Recognition of a judicial power to engage in policy
nullification at sentencing is bad constitutional law for a
number of reasons. Its stronger form-allowing judges to
reject express sentencing policies adopted by legislatures-is
the most problematic. But even the weaker form, in which
judges ignore implicit policy choices like those embedded in
offense definitions, is an improper exercise of the judicial
function. Nothing in the Constitution points strongly in favor
of recognizing such a power, but several important
constitutional values oppose it.
First is the sheer inconsistency between the power of
258. See supra Parts II.A.3 & III.A.3.
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policy nullification at sentencing and the constitutional
norms the Court otherwise insists must be applied when
courts must interpret and apply issues of public policy. On
matters of constitutional law, of course, the courts have
claimed primacy since at least Marbury v. Madison.2 " But on
matters of non-constitutional law, the role of the courts is to
interpret and apply the policies adopted by the legislature or
the executive branch enforcement authorities, lest they
substituted the views of unelected judges for the policy
judgments of the political branches.2 60 Numerous decisions of
the Court emphasize that the political branches are entitled
to make bad policy choices, and the courts cannot overturn
them absent a constitutional violation.2 6 1
When it comes to criminal sentencing, the same
principles govern. The Court has heard constitutional
challenges to the punishments statutorily authorized by
262 ha alegislatures, and has acknowledged that procedural due
process applies to sentencing hearings.2 63 By contrast, the
259. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 1.1-1.6 (4th ed. 2007).
260. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3
(5th ed. 2009) (discussing the doctrine of "Chevron deference" given by federal
courts to executive branch agency interpretations of statutes enacted by
Congress).
261. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27-28 (2003)
To be sure, California's three strikes law has sparked controversy.
Critics have doubted the law's wisdom, cost-efficiency, and
effectiveness in reaching its goals . . . . [But] [ilt is enough that the
State of California has a reasonable basis for believing that
dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons "advances the
goals of its criminal justice system in any substantial way."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
262. Many challenges to sentences authorized by statute are made under the
Eighth Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishments. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11 (challenge to "three-
strikes" statute); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (challenge to death
penalty for juvenile); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (granting
certiorari to hear challenge to life-without-parole sentence for juvenile);
Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No.
08-7412).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (noting that
Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for factfinding by preponderance of the
evidence, and commenting that "we have held that application of the
preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.") (citing
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) and Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 747-48 (1994)); Berman & Bibas, supra note 17, at 45, 59
(noting that procedural due process applies to sentencing).
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Court has never suggested that the substantive merit of the
sentence imposed on a defendant by a judge is subject to
constitutional review in and of itself. Its treatment of
sentencing appeals confirms this-after all, if the merits of a
sentence are themselves issues of constitutional magnitude,
surely the standard of review would be de novo, just as it is
for other constitutional claims, rather than abuse of
discretion.264 Without an issue of constitutional law in play,
courts have no authority to assert the primacy of their view of
appropriate policy on any particular topic. Thus, if the merits
of the judge's sentencing determination are a non-
constitutional matter, then there is no constitutional
justification for privileging judicial decision-making over
legislative policy choices.
Similarly, vesting the power of policy nullification in trial
judges is inconsistent with the ordinary constitutional norms
regarding allocation of power and institutional competence.
The Court has not hesitated to disclaim judicial power over
areas in which courts are, due to their institutional position,
suboptimal decision-makers. Classic examples include
doctrines of deference to agency expertise on technical or
empirical questions, or appellate court deference to trial court
assessments of witness credibility. 265 But this norm extends
even to constitutional questions in which judges are not well
suited to intervene, such as the allocation of power between
the political branches in matters of foreign affairs or the
jurisdictional exception of the political question doctrine.2 66
264. See supra note 85; Hessick & Hessick, supra note 15, at 14 (noting that
questions of law are typically reviewed de novo); id. at 26-27 (noting that policy
questions typically are treated as questions of law subject to de novo review, in
contrast to the deferential review applied in Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85 (2007)).
265. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 260, at § 6.9 ("An agency with expertise in
a particular area of regulation has an enormous advantage over a reviewing
court in making this complicated judgment."); Salve Regina College v. Russell,
499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)
Rule 52(a) commands that . . . due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses
. . . [and] we have held that deferential review of mixed questions of
law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court is
better positioned than the appellate court to decide the issue in
question ....
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
266. See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 259, at § 6.3 (judicial role in
foreign affairs); id. at § 2.16 (political question doctrine).
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In criminal sentencing, trial judges clearly have high
competence to determine the particular facts of each case. In
both Gall and Kimbrough, for example, the Court emphasized
that trial judges "have an institutional advantage over
appellate courts" in determining salient details about "the
individual case and the individual defendant."26 7 And surely
the Court is correct that trial judges are optimally situated to
engage in the particularized and nuanced factfinding
necessary to individualized punishment.
But it does not follow that trial judges also have equally
high competence in taking into account concerns about
systemic uniformity or in making substantive decisions about
appropriate sentencing policy at the national or state level.
In Gall the Court claimed that a trial judge "is in a superior
position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a)
in the individual case."2 68 Why is that true? The Court did
not provide an explanation for its conclusion. Undeniably the
sentencing judge was in the best position to determine
whether Gall's offense was the product of his age and
immaturity at the time. But what makes that judge better
suited than an appellate court or legislature to determine
how much of a discount Gall was entitled to because of those
factors? Likewise, while the sentencing judge was best
positioned to assess the presence or absence of Gall's family
ties, it does not mean the judge was also best suited to
making the systemic policy decision about the role family ties
should play, if any, in calculating a sentence. Even more so
in Kimbrough: how does expertise in determining the facts of
a particular case have any relevance to the systemic policy
decision about the appropriate punishment policy for crack
and powder cocaine? Yet in Kimbrough and Spears the Court
declared that district judges are entitled to make their own
judgments of appropriate cocaine sentencing policy, without
any acknowledgement that trial judges have a comparative
institutional disadvantage in matters of systemic uniformity.
The Court's seemingly discordant perspective on policy-
267. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007) (quoting Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996)); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109
(2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
268. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief for Federal Public and Community
Defenders et al. as Amici Curiae at 16, Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (No. 06-7949))
(emphasis added).
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making and institutional competence makes complete sense,
however, when viewed in light of the analysis presented
above: the Court is constitutionalizing the primacy of
individualized sentencing over considerations of systemic
uniformity.269 That is, if the Constitution privileges
individualized punishment as the principal objective of
sentencing, then it makes sense that the Court would view
trial judges as the institution best situated to implement that
goal. Likewise, if individualized punishment trumps systemic
uniformity as a constitutional value, then the entire notion of
sentencing policy at the aggregate level is marginalized. It
may be true that sentencing decisions are non-constitutional
decisions in the sense that a defendant lacks any
constitutional basis to challenge the substantive merits of the
particular sentence imposed upon him-but judicial primacy
over sentencing nevertheless comes from a different
constitutional source, the mandate of individualized
punishment. In fact, if individualized punishment within the
exclusive domain of trial judges is constitutionally required,
as Justice Scalia seems to be suggesting, then "sentencing
policy" essentially becomes an oxymoron because the Court
would have eliminated any meaningful obligation to consider
systemic factors when imposing sentence in any particular
case.
Once again, as discussed above, the Court's position
reveals that its underlying concern is not the identity of the
factfinder but the identity of the institution holding the power
to determine the normative worth of sentencing facts. 270 Just
as the Court's decisions protecting the trial court's discretion
to calculate the sentence have nothing to do with jury power
at sentencing, so too does the power of policy nullification
protect judicial power over the third stage of a sentencing
decision. In Rita and Gall, the Court reaffirmed the validity
of judicial extraverdict factfinding at sentencing, so long as
the weight carried by those facts in increasing or decreasing
269. See supra Part III.A.3; see also Bibas & Klein, supra note 15, at 780
("The Court greatly weakens policy uniformity by allowing district judges to
inject their own policy views."); Bowman, supra note 1, at 39 (praising "the
simplicity, modesty, and rationality" of the manner in which the Washington
sentencing guidelines invalidated in Blakely sought to balance systemic
uniformity and individualized punishment).
270. See supra Part III.A.3.
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the sentence, respectively, is decided by the judge. In both
cases the Court emphasized that the judge takes into account
the advice of the Guidelines about which facts to find and how
much they are worth, but is not compelled to impose the
sentence recommended by them. The same is true in the
context of policy nullification. In Kimbrough, both the district
judge and the Court agreed with the Guidelines that the
quantities of crack and powder cocaine were facts relevant to
punishment, and the Court ratified the district judge's
decision to assign a far lower weight to the crack quantity
than the Guidelines recommended. Similarly, a statute
prohibiting a judge from relying upon age or family ties in
calculating a sentence has the effect of assigning a mandatory
weight of zero to those facts, precluding the judge from
increasing or decreasing the sentence based upon finding
them. If the stronger form of policy nullification were used to
deem such a statute unconstitutional, it would be because the
statute unconstitutionally interferes with the judge's power to
determine the normative worth of sentencing facts.
The problem, of course, is that the Constitution does not
adopt a single approach to sentencing, nor does it entrench
the supremacy of one sentencing perspective over the other.
Certainly, the determination of the specific sentence to be
imposed in a particular case has nothing to do with the Jury
Trial Clause. Justice Alito had it exactly right in Gall,
writing that "[wlhat is at issue, instead, is the allocation of
the authority to decide issues of substantive sentencing
policy, an issue on which the Sixth Amendment says
absolutely nothing."2 71 No other provision of the Constitution
commands exclusive judicial power over sentencing, either,
and neither the separation of powers nor the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure can justify it. In the end,
then, policy nullification is simply yet another example of the
Court's misguided approach to the constitutional law of
sentencing, and the illegitimate judicial power-grab at the
271. Gall, 552 U.S. at 64 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 66.
A sentencing system that gives trial judges the discretion to sentence
within a specified range ... also gives individual judges discretion to
implement their own sentencing policies. This latter feature, whether
wise or unwise, has nothing to do with the concerns of the Sixth
Amendment, and a principal objective of the Sentencing Reform Act
was to take this power out of the hands of individual district judges.
Id.
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core of the doctrine it has developed.
C. Correcting Course: Fixing the Court's Errors in the
Apprendi Doctrine
With all of these profound problems afflicting the Court's
version of the Apprendi doctrine, the need for a course
correction is apparent. Fortunately, a solution is available
that will eliminate the deep flaws in the Court's approach
without voiding wholesale the Court's rightful concern about
the need for some constitutional law of sentencing.
The Court can solve the problems in the Apprendi
doctrine by restoring the doctrine to its roots in Apprendi-
Harris and abrogating the expansions it has imposed atop the
core Apprendi principle. The doctrine's foundation in
Apprendi is important, and it is easily constitutionally
justified. When verdict facts are established, those facts are
the only ones that can constitutionally be used to determine
the offense of conviction. Consequently, the Court was
correct in Apprendi to hold that the verdict facts must be
mapped over to the offense-defining statutes in determining
the maximum punishment authorized for those facts by those
statutes. 272 The use of extraverdict factfinding to exceed the
maximum sentence available for the verdict facts is likewise
unconstitutional precisely because it is contrary to the
constitutional structure of criminal procedure by allowing
punishment as though the defendant had been convicted for a
greater offense of which he was not actually convicted.27 3
When the Apprendi doctrine is limited to this basic principle,
it serves important constitutional values without producing
absurd formalisms and unjustified judicial power-grabs.
This solution also requires, therefore, that the Court
overrule its Blakely-Booker expansion of the Apprendi
doctrine and the corresponding remedial ramifications under
Booker-Rita reasonableness review. That is where the Court
has gone astray, by extending to sentencing-regulating
provisions a constitutional doctrine necessary to enforce the
constitutional structure of criminal procedure with respect to
offense-defining statutes. The Court should reverse this
extension, and restore the new constitutional law of
272. Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 873-76.
273. Id. at 896-902; Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, 230-31.
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sentencing to its original scope,27 enforcing the line between
offense-defining and sentencing-regulating provisions, but not
prohibiting the use of the latter. For similar reasons, the
Court should reject Justice Scalia's call to expand the doctrine
further to encompass as-applied challenges, especially to the
extent his position constitutionalizes deferential appellate
review of sentencing decisions by trial judges. So long as the
verdict facts determine the offense of conviction, and the
ultimate sentence imposed is within the boundaries delimited
by that offense, the Court should hold that the use of
mandatory sentencing-regulating provisions to restrict the
judge's discretion in calculating that sentence does not violate
the Constitution.7
The consequences of this course correction would be to
restore the constitutionality of the various forms of
sentencing laws that the Court had invalidated. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines could, for example, once again be
enforced with mandatory effect; so could similar state
sentencing regimes, and related state systems like
presumptive sentences or upper- and lower-term sentencing
ranges. Similarly, appellate review would not be constrained
to abuse of discretion, but could be de novo or another
substantially less deferential standard. Most of all, the
course correction would once again allow the fifty states to
experiment with numerous variations on the full range of
sentencing-regulating provisions, from trial court discretion
with deferential appellate review to mandatory sentencing
guidelines with de novo review, and everything in between.
Given the wide range of normative and empirical
disagreements about what constitutes the wisest, fairest, and
most effective sentencing policy, it is difficult to see why this
wide latitude for state experimentation would not be a
274. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 896-910;
Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 9, at 301-08. Professor Bowman argues
for a similar position: "[T]he Court should acknowledge that some reasonable
legislative guidance of judicial sentencing discretion is constitutionally
legitimate and practically beneficial and devote its future energies to the task of
maintaining a reasonable balance between legislative, judicial, executive, and
citizen jury control over sentencing outcomes." Bowman, supra note 1, at 99.
275. Professor Bowman suggests that the Court should continue to impose
some limits on the use of mandatory sentencing-regulating provisions, but
argues that the constitutional source for such limits should be the Due Process
Clause, rather than the Sixth Amendment. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 91-
94.
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salutary development.
Similarly, if the Court were to reverse course with its
expansions of the Apprendi doctrine, then the potential
implications of overruling Harris become far less severe. The
constitutional structure of criminal procedure supports
preserving the holding of Harris: once the verdict facts have
established the outermost, worst-case scenario for
punishment, then the defendant has no constitutionally
cognizable entitlement to any particular merciful sentence
less than that maximum, and therefore the use of
extraverdict factfinding to determine the precise sentence is
constitutionally permissible.27 6 A majority on the current
Court may see the issue differently, though, reasoning that
the verdict facts should determine both the defendant's worst-
case and best-case scenario for punishment." Once the
Court has corrected course and limited the scope of the
Apprendi doctrine to simply Apprendi itself, then overruling
Harris would not be problematic. If the doctrine only applies
to the sentencing constraints imposed by offense-defining
statutes, then overruling Harris would have the effect of
requiring only that the mandatory minimum sentences
included within offense-defining statutes be triggered by
verdict facts. Other mandatory increases in the low end of
the available sentence, such as sentencing guidelines
calculations or statutory sentencing-regulating provisions,
would remain subject to extraverdict factfinding.
Finally, the Court should, of course, correct the Apprendi
doctrine by making clear that the Constitution does not codify
any particular balance between the objective of imposing
individualized punishment for each defendant on the one
hand, and the objective of systemic uniformity in the
consideration of sentencing facts and their normative weight
on the other. That balance is a highly controversial and hotly
contested issue, and it is one on which constitutional law
ought to remain silent. Aside from permitting the legislature
to resolve such a disputed question of sentencing policy,
276. Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 10, at 902-09 (arguing that
the constitutional structure of criminal procedure supports the decision in
Harris).
277. See supra notes 62-70 & 150-152 and accompanying text (discussing
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)). Professor Bowman argues for
overruling Harris for this reason. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 16-21, 34-37.
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removing constitutional obstacles to striking the balance also
would facilitate even more experimentation in sentencing
regimes among the states. Leaving more options on the table
will, in the long term, likely produce far more insights into
fair and effective sentencing policy than foreclosing numerous
avenues as a matter of constitutional law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the Court to acknowledge the
numerous serious problems with its new constitutional law of
sentencing, and to correct course by bringing the doctrine
back to its foundational principles. The Court should restore
the Apprendi doctrine to its core purpose of preserving the
integrity of the verdict facts and ensuring that the
punishment imposed on the convicted defendant is consistent
with the sentence authorized by the offense of conviction.
Beyond that, however, the Court should abrogate its
expansions of the doctrine. By doing so the Court would
eliminate the absurd formalisms embedded in the current
doctrine and the perverse incentive for sentencing judges to
be more arbitrary and less transparent in their reasoning
when determining punishment. The retrenchment of the
Apprendi doctrine also would place the constitutional law of
sentencing on sound conceptual footing in the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure, rather than solely in the
illegitimate protection of judicial power.
Finally, the Court should disclaim any constitutional
mandate for the authority for sentencing judges to engage in
"policy nullification" when they reject legislatively adopted
sentencing policies in favor of the judges' own policy
preferences, whether those policies are contained in the
implicit spirit of the law or express declarations of sentencing
policy enacted in statutes. Instead, the Court should
recognize that decisions of non-constitutional sentencing
policy rightfully belong to legislatures. Even when faced with
bad legislative policy judgments, the solution should not be
the Court's bad constitutional law. Otherwise, criminal
sentencing may be lost in Bizarro World for years to come.
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